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## **Sudan: A Year of Wavering Indecision**

Only two new developments of significance occurred during 1980: the dramatic attempt at rapprochement with Ethiopia, and the inauguration of regional government as a step towards administrative devolution. Controversy continued over the issue of 'national reconciliation', with the former opposition leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, still calling for radical changes in the political system, and Numeiry's hard-line supporters in the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) accusing the former opposition of using public forums for ends contrary to their own revolutionary goals.

In Southern Sudan, Abel Alier was brought back to the presidency of the High Executive Council (NEC), following the April elections. In the economic field, the picture continued to be gloomy as Sudan desperately tried to come to grips with economic and financial problems that seemed to be constantly moving one step ahead of remedial measures, But there was some glimpse of future improvement with the official confirmation of important oil discoveries.

In foreign affairs, the regime continued to distance itself from Egypt, especially from the Camp David peace process, and to draw closer to the more conservative Arab states. Iraq's change of policy helped in beginning a rapprochement between the two countries. But Sudan's foreign interests continued to be mainly focused on its African neighbours.

The domestic scene witnessed three main developments in 1980: the continuing search for a mutually acceptable formula for national reconciliation; the Sudan's bold move into the still largely uncharted waters of regional government; and a change of administration in Southern Sudan that seemed to move the region's politics back to square one but which, at the same time, seemed at least temporarily to have strengthened Numeiry's position in that volatile region.<sup>1</sup>

## **POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

### *The Presidents Role and Government Changes:*

Gen Gaafar Numeiry, 51, celebrated his eleventh year in power on 25 May 1981. There was no time during that period when he was not under the threat either of coups or political pressures to replace him; but the only immediate threat to his political future during 1980 came from evidence of his failing health. He had gone to the US for medical treatment in late 1979, supposedly for a heart ailment with complications from diabetes and returned again for three weeks' treatment in late June 1980, necessitating his missing the OAU summit at Freetown. But although his health seemed to reduce the long hours he usually spent in his office, it did not prevent him from stumping the country explaining the proposals for the new form of regional government and drumming up support for the ailing ruling party. His highly personal style of leadership remained unchanged; only his energy seems to have lessened.

He continued to practice his characteristic techniques for overcoming problems temporarily, and of removing potential new power centres, by making frequent Cabinet changes. Minor changes were made on 5 and 13 March 1980, the only significant one being the removal of Izz ai-Din Hamid as Minister of State for Egyptian Affairs, a post which was left vacant. Three months later, on 3 June, he made more substantial changes. AI-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr lost his positions both as Vice-President (a post he had filled since 1976) and as Foreign Minister (a post he had held since late 1977). Jalal Ali Lutfi was removed as Minister of People's Assembly Affairs, a position he had held since its inception in August 1979. Both dismissed Ministers were appointed as members of the People's National Assembly; no immediate replacements were announced for the vacant posts. At the same time, Numeiry re-established the Ministry for Internal Affairs, which he had abolished only in February 1979, with Ahmad al-Rahman as the new Minister. The Minister of State for Public Service and Administrative Reform was given full Cabinet rank. There was considerable speculation over Bakr's sharp demotion from the Vice-Presidency and as Foreign Minister. Some saw it as reflecting a change of policy towards Egypt – Bakr was noted for his pro-Cairo stance and was thought to have resisted attempts to weaken Sudan-Egypt links; others suggested that he was reluctant to endorse Numeiry's new rapprochement with Ethiopia if it meant weakening support for the Eritreans -- an explanation offered by the Kuwaiti paper, *al Qabas*, on 8 June 1980.

Numeiry was the only nominee for the chairmanship of the SSU at its third congress. He was also able to ensure that all the successful candidates for the SSU Political Bureau were either his personal supporters or men who have worked closely with his regime.

The President's ambivalent attitude towards President Sadat became more pronounced in 1980. At first he swung right against Sadat after he had established diplomatic relations with Israel but later, when faced with a new incipient threat from Libya following Col Gaddafi's military intervention in Chad, he showed fresh interest in re-establishing his military ties with Cairo.

The President also embarked on yet another programme of economic reform in 1980 which he outlined in his speech at the opening of the newly-elected People's National Assembly on 11 June. It proposed to eliminate state monopolies in export-import trade to encourage greater competition, and to cut back on public spending. At the same time, he put even more emphasis on the need for 'rebuilding the agricultural sector' which, he said, had suffered a persistent regression, especially in the previous five years. But the real thrust of his 1980 policies was to keep alive the process of 'national reconciliation' and to decentralize government by transferring more responsibility to regional governments – a basic concept in his political framework. Despite the centralization of power in the President's hands, Numeiry continued to stress the importance of moving 'towards a complete delivery of power into the hands of the Sudanese people.'

#### *National Reconciliation:*

The SSU third national congress, held from 26 January to 2 February 1980, became yet another forum for the seemingly endless controversy over the issue of national reconciliation. Sadiq al-Mahdi and other former opposition leaders had hoped that President Numeiry would use the occasion to resolve, once and for all, some of the outstanding obstacles facing the reconciliation process. In the event, however, the congress platform was seized by SSU hardliners to dramatize their opposition to the whole policy of reconciliation. At issue was the relationship between the former opposition -- the so-called 'political returnees'-- and the political system. Since his return to Sudan in 1977, Sadiq al-Mahdi had consistently called for radical and structural change in the political system, essentially envisaging the reform of existing institutions along what he called 'alternative democratic lines'.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, SSU partisans regarded the participation of some opposition elements in the political organizations as a sufficient concession. Indeed, some of them even questioned its wisdom and blamed 'the negative performance of the returnees' for

the 'mismanagement in the SSU and the divergence of the May Revolution from its principles'.<sup>3</sup>

The outcome of the SSU congress, which, in effect, amounted to maintaining the *status quo* in the reconciliation process, must have come as a bitter disappointment to Sadiq al-Mahdi and his associates. While few doubted Numeiry's continued commitment to reconciliation, it was an open secret that some of those around him still sought to undermine it and that he was obviously not yet inclined to act effectively in restraining them. Indeed, the President's own attitude seemed to harden when he announced on 17 February that the new elections to the People's National Assembly and the Southern Regional Assembly could only be contested within the framework of, and after endorsement by, the SSU. Some outside observers saw Numeiry's decision to dissolve the two Assemblies and to hold new elections as another attempt to 'further enhance his authority and give the lie to opposition claims of popular support.'<sup>4</sup> The Ansar opposition's view, however, was that the elections were not being held within the agreed framework of radical reform which included primarily changing the structure of political organization itself: to contest elections under such circumstances was, according to Sadiq al-Mahdi, to accept the SSU as 'both the adversary and the referee'.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the Ansar decided to boycott the elections, bringing the reconciliation process to another critical low point. Yet, Sadiq seemed anxious to prevent any drift into an irrevocable break with Numeiry's regime. Thus, while his criticisms of the policies and practices of existing institutions continued -- underlined pointedly by his own 'non-participation' in Government and party organs -- he still reiterated his belief that Sudan, as a result of reconciliation, 'was enjoying a political climate more free than in many Arab and African states.'<sup>6</sup> He also undertook missions on behalf of the regime to Libya and Saudi Arabia, and seems to have had a hand in trying to improve relations with the USSR. This rather ambivalent stance of his, contrasted sharply with the attitudes of other traditional and/or opposition groups. Some Unionist elements traditionally associated with the Khatmiya religious sect, and the Muslim Brothers group under the leadership of Dr Hassan al-Turabi, had opted to participate actively in the political process. It was, perhaps, indicative of their increasingly active involvement in the political arena that when the 300-member SSU central committee came to elect its politbureau both the Unionist leader, Dr Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, Minister of Communications, and Dr Turabi, the Attorney-General, gained positions. No Ansar leader was elected. The 17 members of the new bureau are:

I. Abel Alier, a senior Southern politician, Vice-President of the Republic from 1971 to February 1978 and from June 1980; currently President of the Southern High Executive Council (HEC).

2. Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Ahmad Abd al-Qadir, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) set up in May 1969.
  3. Col Khalid Hasan Abbas, Health Minister and a member of the RCC.
  4. Maj Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib, head of the State Security Department since August 1978.
  5. Al-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr, Vice-President of the Republic from 1976 to June 1980 and, from September 1977 to June 1980, Foreign Minister.
  6. Badr al-Din Muhammad Sulayman, Ombudsman from October 1972 to January 1975, and Minister of Industry until 1977. From March 1978 to May 1979 he served as the leader of the People's National Assembly.
  7. Mahdi Mustafa al-Hadi, supervisor of the People's National Assembly from March 1978 and the Commissioner for Khartoum from July 1978.
  8. Dr Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, a prominent leader of the old Popular Democratic Party (which drew its main support from the Khatmiyya), Minister of Transport and Communications from August, 1979.
  9. Awn al-Sharif Qasim, a veteran politician mainly concerned with religious affairs. Served as Minister of Waqfs and Religious Affairs until the Ministry was abolished in February 1979. From August 1979 served as leader of the People's National Assembly.
  10. Ismail al-Hajj Musa, served from August 1979 as Minister of Culture and Information.
- II. Dr. Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, the Muslim Brethren leader, served from August 1979 as Attorney-General.
12. Prof Abdalla Ahmed Abdalla, Minister of Agriculture, Food and National Resources from February 1977 until March 1980.
  13. Peter Gatkouth Gual, a senior Southern politician who served in the Southern regional government from February 1979.
  14. Hilary Paulo Logali, a senior Southern politician who held posts in both the Central and Southern governments and a Minister again in the new HEC (see below).
  15. Bona Malwal, one of the most influential Southern leaders, who served as Culture and Information Minister until September 1978 when he went to continue his studies at St Anthony's, Oxford, Minister of Industry in new HEC.

16. Lt-Gen Joseph Lagu, the major leader of the Anya-nya and leader of the South when the Addis Ababa agreement was signed in 1972. He served until February 1978 as Commander of the First Division. President of the Southern HEC from February 1978 to February 1980.

17. Nafisa Ahmad al-Amin.

### *The Government (as at 3 June 1980)*

President and Prime Minister: Gen Gaafar Mohamed Numeiry

Vice-President: Abel Alier

#### Ministers:

Agriculture, Nutrition and Natural Resources: Umar al-Amin  
Transport and Communications: Dr Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad  
Construction and Public Works: Mohammed Sid Ahmed Abdalla  
Cooperation, Trade and Supply: Faruq Ibrahim al-Maobul  
Culture and Information: Ismail al-Haj Musa  
Defence: Lt-Gen. Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil  
Education and Orientation: Daf' allah al-Haj Yusdf  
Energy and Mining: Sharif al-Tuhami  
Finance and National Economy: Badr al-Din Suliman  
Foreign Affairs: Vacant  
Health: Col Khalid Hasan Abbas  
Industry: Izz al-din Hamid  
Irrigation and Electric power: al-Rayah Abdal-Salam  
People's Assembly Affairs: Ahmad al-Rahman  
Public Services and Administrative Reform: Haydar Kabsun  
Attorney-General: Dr Hassan Abdallah ai-Turabi

### *The Opposition Movement*

Exile opposition elements continued their campaign to bring down Numeiry's regime in 1980. After his break with Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Unionist leader, Hassen Sharif ai-Hindi, had joined the Communist Party and the Sudanese Ba'thist elements to form the Sudanese Democratic Front (SDF). The Communist Party, whose members inside Sudan were systematically subjected to vigilance and harassment by the security forces, regarded the policy of national reconciliation as 'a desperate attempt to restore the credibility of an isolated regime that had proved incapable of carrying out its promises of

liberalization'.<sup>7</sup> Towards the end of 1980, the SDF shifted its opposition tactics from advocating armed uprisings to calling for civil disobedience and political strikes. According to al-Hindi, the tactical change was made to avoid direct confrontation with the armed forces, which were seen as becoming increasingly alienated from Numeiry's regime.<sup>8</sup>

To some local observers, Sadiq al-Mahdi seemed to have placed himself in the rather difficult position of being neither willing to condemn the regime openly (as al-Hindi had done) for its failure to deliver the necessary reforms, nor yet able to work from within the regime (as al-Turabi was doing) to influence its political orientation. Sadiq, however, insisted that his position was right and that both his former partners had deviated from the reconciliation agreement. In an unpublished interview he argued that events had vindicated his analysis of the situation and that 'more people (around Numeiry) who, hitherto, had maintained an attitude of hostility of indifference towards reconciliation are reviewing their position, in the sense that they can see now that some change needs to be made to face the issues and the challenges. This is the new factor in the old process of reconciliation.'<sup>9</sup> Whether Sadiq's optimism about the prospects of radical reform was justifiable or not still remained to be seen.

The appointment of the First Vice-President, Abd ai-Majid Hamid Khalil, in mid-September 1980 as SSu Secretary-General was seen by Sadiq's group as a positive measure that could lead to an objective assessment of the political organization by someone who was not involved in partisan issues. At the end of 1980 Numeiry pronounced national reconciliation a success, and praised the efforts of Sadiq al-Mahdi in the Islamic and Arab fields. Yet, so far, no radical reforms had materialized and the debates over reconciliation in the Press during 1980 reflected partisan stands and mutual recriminations that hardly seemed conducive to the aspirations for change evident in almost all sections of Sudanese society. As one former Foreign Minister and presidential adviser in Numeiry's regime put it: 'The solution to this problem is to democratize more and more, and have more elected positions, more independence for trade unions, a measure of freedom of expression with the Press and more opportunity for the alternative view.'<sup>10</sup>

#### *The Institution of Regional Government:*

The SSU Third National Congress was also the setting for another controversy, this time over the issue of regional government. While there was a general consensus on the need for decentralization, there were acute differences on the details of the process. The experience of the Regional Self-government Act for the Southern Region dominated much of the discussion on the laws of regional government. According to the official publication, *Sudanow*: 'the Act had come into force before the promulgation of the Permanent Constitution and many constitutional provisions had not found expression in

the Act. Now, because of the way the Act had been drafted, it was difficult to incorporate the missing constitutional measures into it. Since many of these gaps went into the heart of the political system. It was essential to make sure that they did not recur in the legislation of the new regions.<sup>11</sup>

The Congress eventually endorsed most of the proposed laws of regional, government.<sup>12</sup> More controversial, though, was the issue of regional divisions and boundaries. The delegates from Western and Eastern Sudan rejected the various schemes for the new divisions drawn up by Vice-President Abel Alier's committee on regional government. Both Kordofan and Darfur provinces refused to be lumped together in a Western region and successfully fought to retain their present provincial boundaries; while the provinces of the Red Sea and Kasala managed to block their amalgamation with the Nile and Northern provinces in a Northern region.

The Constitution was amended in July 1980 to embody regional government as a basic part of government in the country. In October, President Numeiry presented the 1980 Regional Government Bill and the 1980 Khartoum Province Administration Bill to the Council of Ministers. The latter bill confirmed the status of Khartoum as the national capital and established the administrative organs of the province. During October, regional development conferences were held in various parts of the country to discuss the best ways of instituting political, social and economic development programmes in the different regions.

One major problem of regional government was the allocation of funds from Central Government. While it was expected that more consideration in fund allocation would be given to the less-developed regions, the experience of the Southern Region, and the meagre economic resources of the country as a whole, clearly indicated that the question of fund allocation was bound to constitute a very sensitive point in future relations between the central and regional Governments as it is in Federal Nigeria with its infinitely greater resources.

In January 1981, President Numeiry appointed the following Governors to the five new regions: Abdalla Ahmad Abdalla (Northern Region), Ahmad Ibrahim Duraig (Darfur Region), Abd al-Rahim Mahmoud (Central Region), Al-Fatih Bushara (Kordofan Region) and Hamid Ali Shash (Eastern Region).

The inauguration of regional government was also the occasion of some tragic events in Darfur Region that were perhaps indicative of the potential hazards in the whole concept of regional government. People in Darfur objected to Numeiry's first choice for Governor of the Region because he was not a native of Darfur. When their objection went unheeded in Khartoum, rioting broke out in the region, resulting in several deaths. It was

only after an appeal from the Darfur caucus in the National Assembly that the President agreed to replace the Governor with a more acceptable choice.

## **SOUTHERN SUDAN AFFAIRS**

Elections in the South came as a climax to a political crisis that had begun in February 1979 when the then HEC President, Gen Joseph Lagu, dismissed most of his former allies in the government and replaced them with associates of his political rival, Abel Alier. This reshuffle set in motion a series of events which culminated in the dissolution of the Regional Assembly by President Numeiry and the resignation of Lagu in February 1980.<sup>13</sup> The peculiar circumstances of Lagu's departure did little to reduce the atmosphere of crisis. Although during his two-year term in office Lagu had managed to antagonize many groups in the South and had brought against himself allegations of corruption and nepotism, some Southern politicians believed that he was being 'victimized' for his dismissal of certain Dinka members from his Cabinet, and for his 'anti-*Shari'a* attitude'.<sup>14</sup> (The various Dinka clans form the majority of the South's population; but they are by no means politically united.) Nor did Lagu's replacement as interim President by Vice-President Peter Gatkouth seem to meet with much approval among Southerners. Some saw Gatkouth's elevation as 'a blatant contravention of the Addis Ababa agreement, which stipulates that if the President of the HEC resigns, then the entire Cabinet is automatically dissolved'.<sup>15</sup>

The elections to the new Regional Assembly, which were held in April 1980, seemed to generate little enthusiasm among the majority of Southerners. For one thing, the lines of demarcation between contending groups were not as clearly drawn as in the 1978 elections when the electorate had to choose between Lagu's 'wind of change' platform and Alier's *status quo* group.<sup>16</sup> There was also a detectable atmosphere of political apathy arising from disillusionment with the past performance of the leaders contesting the elections.<sup>17</sup>

The new Regional Assembly immediately became the scene for an acute power struggle. In a very real sense, the new Assembly was the first of its kind to have a real choice in the selection of the HEC President. In 1974, the regional and national SSU hierarchy exercised pressure in order to ensure the unopposed election of Abel Alier. The same pattern was repeated after the 1978 elections when Numeiry persuaded Alier to step down rather than contest Lagu's challenge for leadership. In both cases, these manoeuvres and pressures were perhaps genuinely motivated by concerns to avoid disruptive confrontations and to forestall a drift towards the discredited partisan politics of the past. But in the 1980 elections it was clear that the political mood in the South would no longer accept such patronizing constraints." Thus, Numeiry was advised to keep well away from

the power struggle for the HEC presidency. The contest in the Regional Assembly finally narrowed to two main candidates: Abel Alier -- who was backed by Peter Gatkouth and, in the final stages, by Hilary Logali -- and Samuel Aru, who was supported by Lagu's group. Alier won the presidency with 67 votes to Aru's 35.

*Southern Sudan Higher Executive Council (as at April 1980)*

President of the HEC: Abel Alier

Vice-President and Regional Minister of Finance and Planning: Peter Gatkouth

Regional Ministers:

Public Administration, Police and Prisons: Hilary Logali

Agriculture and Mineral Resources: Gama Hassan

Public Service and Administrative Reform: Joseph Oduho

Industry: Bona Malwal

Commerce and Supply: Arthur Akwin

Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism: Samuel Abujon

Health: Zakariah Deng

Education: Andrew Wiew

Legal Affairs and Coordination: Martin Majier

Rural Development and Cooperatives: Justin Yak

Culture and Information: Joseph Akiel

Transport and Roads: Wzai Kulang

HEC Affairs: Angelo Otharu

Adviser to President for Local Government Affairs: Manoah Majok

Speaker of the Regional Assembly: Angelo Beda

While his victory in the Regional Assembly was overwhelming, President Alier's announcement of his new government was received with 'guarded disapproval' among a number of Southern politicians. He was criticized for bringing back into the Government the same people who were rejected by the electorate in 1978, some of whom were accused of corrupt practices. The formation of the new administration was also suspected of being 'tribalistic'. The challenges facing Alier's new Government in 1980 were no less formidable than those he had faced in 1974.<sup>19</sup> The first priority was to bring about rapid economic development in the region. Alier's major asset still remained his long and good working relationship with Numeiry but, given the volatile nature of Southern politics, even this could change into a political liability if the new Administration should fail to live up to its promises. As one observer noted, "Unless Alier comes out with a radical political programme based on self-reliance, and supplies the badly-needed exemplary

leadership in the South capable of putting the only resources available to good economic use his Government will fall in the same way as its predecessor.”<sup>20</sup>

## **SOCIAL AFFAIRS**

### *The Refugee Problem*

As upheavals and instability continued to plague neighbouring countries, the influx of refugees into Sudan kept increasing—a trend encouraged by the country's enlightened policy of refusing to turn back anyone seeking asylum. Refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Zaire and Chad were estimated at 600,000 in 1980. (See Essay on Refugees) This swelling refugee population had reached proportions beyond Sudan's capacity. They constituted a substantial drain on the country's meagre resources and their vast numbers were increasingly becoming a social and security problem. A related and unpleasant development was the increase of domestic discontent vis-à-vis the refugees as people began to blame their economic difficulties on the growing hordes of the country's uninvited guests. While it was to Sudan's credit that this reaction had taken considerable time to surface, its emergence constituted a serious development which, if unchecked, could have ominous implications for Sudanese-refugee relations.

Sudan's first priority, therefore, was to reduce the damaging impact of the refugees on the country's fragile economic and political stability; this obviously required substantial and urgent international aid. Vice-President Abel Alier, Chairman of the National Committee for Aid to Refugees, declared that: “We have an obligation to our own people to ask for help on a scale that will alleviate this appalling problem, and which will enable us to undertake programmes for the carefully regulated settlement of refugees with adequate infrastructural and supporting services that will guarantee self-sufficiency and, eventually, the integration of refugee settlements into the overall development of the community.”<sup>21</sup>

With this goal in mind, an international conference on refugees was held in Khartoum in June 1980. It was attended by representatives from 27 governments (including representatives from several Arab states and Arab banking institutions), and 58 international voluntary agencies. In his opening address, Numeiry called for help from the international community. Sudan as a developing country, he said, could no longer absorb the vast numbers of refugees independent of its own development plans. According to foreign reports, Sudan failed to get the \$50m it urgently requested from the world community. Some of the relief organizations attributed this failure partly to the Government's reluctance to spell out the main cause of the refugee influx. Most delegates tactfully refrained from making any political remarks on the subject of Eritrean and Ugandan refugees. However, one positive aspect of the conference was that the Sudanese

authorities finally agreed to give foreign relief workers more freedom to operate directly in refugee settlements rather than through Sudan's Commissioner of Refugees.

Sudan's refugee problem remains in urgent need of both short-term solutions and an adequately financed long-term strategy. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that many Sudanese are living in conditions worse than the refugees, especially in the Southern region where, according to one relief worker, 'whole communities face starvation and ...are suffering from highly contagious diseases.'<sup>22</sup> Numeiry complained in December 1980 that despite the goodwill of the international community, the amount of aid actually given for the settlement of the refugees was frustratingly inadequate for a country like Sudan. Outside observers seemed to share the sentiment that Sudan was not being given a fair deal. Commenting on a recent study of UNHCR expenditure in East Africa which showed that the agency was spending only \$11 per head per annum in Sudan, *New African* remarked: "If this derisory contribution reflects the lack of political importance attached to Sudan, a country in severe economic difficulties yet crucial because it is at the crossroads of the Arab and African worlds, then it is folly. If on the other hand, it merely reflects the indifference of the international community to the future of Sudan's refugees...then it is a sad reflection on the state of the world's commitment to the poor and disadvantaged." <sup>23</sup>

## **EDUCATION AFFAIRS**

The last decade has seen a substantial expansion at all levels of general education; nearly 7,000 new schools have been established since 1970. Yet, this seemingly considerable achievement has tended to create a new set of problems that threatens to undermine the whole educational system in the country. In the first place, expansion in school building has not been matched by the availability of trained teachers and of funds for essential learning materials. Consequently, the increase in student intake has resulted in a sharp decline in the standards and quality of general education—a decline which, in turn, is reflected in the quality of higher education. Moreover, because of financial and trained personnel shortages, the expansion in general education has not been matched by a corresponding expansion in higher education, thus creating a serious and frustrating bottleneck at the upper echelons of the educational system.

Another related problem is the existing imbalance between technical and professional education in which the bias is strongly in favour of academic institutions.

### *Higher Education Intake Capacity:*

The opening of the new universities of Juba (1977) and Gezira (1978) has not made any serious dent in the problem because of their limited intake capacities. The cost

of running higher education institutions, especially universities, is really prohibitive because most of them are residential institutions with much of the expenditure going towards the students' upkeep. Higher education also suffers from shortages of equipment and funds for academic studies and scientific research. More worrying still is the increasing trend among teaching staff to immigrate to neighbouring countries in search of more rewarding terms of service. This has added to the already alarming brain drain of trained manpower in the country.<sup>24</sup>

Since the universities and other higher institutions are capable of absorbing only a fraction of secondary school leavers, there has been a virtual scramble for placements abroad, with the majority of students competing for places in Egypt. While the growing body of external students (whose total is c. 25% greater than the total registration of university and technical institute students in the country) has tended to ease the local pressures and demands on higher education, they are, nevertheless, pressing disadvantages in the present arrangements for external students. The main difficulty is the rising cost of study abroad and the subsequent strain on foreign currency reserves. According to the Bank of Sudan, \$10,146,624 was transferred to undergraduate students abroad in the 1976-77 academic year.

Another serious problem is the question of accommodation, especially for undergraduates studying in Egyptian universities with few or no accommodation facilities. Other problems are related to the acculturation of Sudanese students with foreign traditions and values, especially for undergraduates studying in Europe. Students abroad also complain of poor and ineffectual relations with Sudan's diplomatic missions. Student politics also spill over into relations within student unions abroad, often causing political splits and partisan conflicts.

#### *Student Politics:*

The problem of student politics in the Sudan was tragically brought into the open in March 1980, when one student died and several others were injured during violent clashes between rival political groups at the University of Khartoum. The violence was precipitated by a conflict within the students' union body as to the true interpretation of the union constitution, with the pro-Government Muslim Brothers confronting a coalition of other groups that included communists, Muslim republicans, independents and some pro-Ansar students. Although the crisis was eventually contained after the university reopened in October 1980, the situation still remained potentially explosive.

Students' active involvement in national politics has always been an established tradition that dates back to the pre-independence period. In October 1964, students were instrumental in bringing down the military regime of Gen Abboud. Since 1969, higher education institutions have been a hot-bed of opposition to the Government. The

demonstrations and riots during August 1979 in Khartoum and various provincial capitals were spearheaded by students. The events at the University of Khartoum were thus symptomatic of a deep-rooted problem of higher education in the Sudan, namely, the question of free student political activity in what is essentially an authoritarian environment. Students resented the restraining, albeit indirect, state influence in University politics, and the refusal of the government-appointed administration to recognize their ideologically-based and politically-oriented groups on campus. It was perhaps inevitable that political violence would be triggered by the absence of political democracy. As one observer noted, "The leading edge of campus politics is the line between what politicized students can effectively demand, and what the Administration can effectively resist -- a sure formula for struggle."<sup>25</sup>

Many educationalists feel the need for a critical and overall evaluation of the present educational system in order to make it more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of students and, more fundamentally, to the growing needs of the country.

## **FOREIGN RELATIONS**

### *Relations with Egypt:*

Sudan's relations with Egypt became increasingly strained following the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel in February 1980. Up to that point, Sudan's views had differed substantially from those of Egypt, but they were not specifically directed against Cairo. Indeed, President Numeiry saw Sudan's special relationship with Egypt as entailing a special duty to prevent Egypt's complete isolation. But Sudan's attempt to strike such a balancing act lacked credibility, and the establishment of Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic relations seemed likely to court diplomatic isolation for Sudan as well. Numeiry's immediate reaction to the normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations was to recall in protest the Sudanese ambassador to Cairo. Although he refrained from making a final break with the Egyptian regime, the President condemned the peace treaty and described normalization as 'passing phenomenon' that would soon disappear in the face of Arab opposition.<sup>26</sup> In early April 1980, a minor war of words briefly flared up between the two countries after the Egyptian Press strongly hinted that Arab money was behind the hardening of Sudan's attitude towards Egypt.<sup>27</sup> The press campaign quickly ended and an atmosphere of mutual indifference seemed to settle over Sudanese-Egyptian relations.

Certain developments during 1980 seemed to draw Sudan still further from Egypt. First, the hardening effects of the Arab boycott of Egypt meant that Egyptian-Sudanese integration plans could be a political and economic liability and that Sudan would have to suspend their implementation. Second, the improvement in relations with Ethiopia tended

to weaken Sudan's security ties with Egypt. These ties had originally been strengthened in 1976 against a background of Ethiopian hostility and had since then effectively prevented Sudan from taking up foreign policy positions that were not agreeable to Egypt.<sup>28</sup> Thus, any improvement in relations with Ethiopia could make it that more easy for Sudan to break out of the Egyptian security orbit.

However, security considerations suddenly assumed added significance in early 1981 when Sudanese-Libyan relations took a turn for the worse and Sudan once again found itself poised to fall back on the familiar, if now uncomfortable, safety of its security arrangements with Egypt.

*Relations with Libya:*

Official relations with Libya remained normal for most of 1980, with Sudan leaning backwards to avoid any new friction with Col Gaddafi. During the civil war in Chad, Sudan refrained from any direct or covert involvement, although it was no secret that the regime's sympathies lay with the anti-Libyan forces of Hissene Habre. Towards the end of 1980, however, developments in Chad were beginning to force Sudan's hand. The defeat of Habre's forces and the Libyan military presence in Chad created a serious security risk to Numeiry's regime. In late December, Numeiry called on Libya to withdraw its forces from Chad. The President also appealed to African leaders to unite their efforts to end the 'Libyan occupation' that constituted 'a threat to peace and security in the African continent'.<sup>29</sup> Sudan attributed the failure of the OAU's Lagos conference to condemn the Libyan presence in Chad to Libyan and Soviet 'intimidation' of the African states.<sup>30</sup> The Sudanese authorities were particularly worried about reports that the Libyans had established a training camp, supervised by Soviet experts, near the Sudanese border. The disturbances in the Western region of Darfur (see above), which occurred during January, might also have raised fears of Libyan attempts to foment more unrest. According to foreign reports, Sudan closed its borders in mid-January 1981 to all foreigners other than diplomats, and was moving troops westwards to reinforce its thin defences along the 600-mile Chadian border.<sup>31</sup>

Khartoum's obvious concern over the growing Libyan military presence on Sudan's western borders and over the planned merger of Chad with Libya, was also reflected in Cairo. President Sadat feared that the Libyans might use Chad as a base of operations to destabilize Sudan as part of a larger plan to strike at Egypt. Sadat declared that the Chadian-Libyan merger had created a 'very dangerous situation because it threatens Sudan, and what threatens Sudan constitutes a threat to Egypt'.<sup>32</sup> Sources in Cairo reported that Sadat-Numeiry contacts were resumed to discuss the implications for Sudan of the Libyan military operations and of its political involvement in Chad. A 'high-level Sudanese official' arrived in Cairo on 24 January 1981 for talks with Sadat and returned to Khartoum a few hours later to report to Numeiry.<sup>33</sup>

Numeiry also met with the visiting French Defence Minister on 30 January to review the current situation in Africa, particularly developments in Chad. Talks were held on bilateral agreements for the provision of French military equipment and training of the Sudanese armed forces. It is clear that Libyan actions in Chad had put Numeiry's regime on edge. Its reactions, so far, have betrayed a certain nervousness over Libya's ultimate intentions. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the potential Libyan threat, and the possible reactivation of the security arrangements with Egypt, would cause Sudan to review its foreign policy options, particularly in relation to its neighbours.

*Relations with Iraq and Syria:*

Diplomatic relations were restored with Baghdad on 8 April 1980, a year after they were severed because of Baathist subversive activities in the Sudan. The improved relationship was due to two developments. First, because Numeiry had personally endorsed the anti-Sadat stand of the Tunis Arab summit in late 1979. Second, because Iraq had itself moved towards a new alignment with the more conservative Arab camp as a reaction to his developing conflict with Khomeiny's Iran. In the Spring of 1980, Iraq resumed its oil shipments to Sudan. The closer rapprochement with Baghdad had as one of its results a worsening of Khartoum's relations with Iraq's rival, Syria. In May 1980, Syrian political groups were calling for the overthrow of Numeiry's regime.

*Relations with Ethiopia:*

Sudan and Ethiopia took significant steps during 1980 to reduce the tension and hostility that had characterized their relations in recent years. The dramatic rapprochement constituted an important breakthrough that seemed to set the stage for a new era of mutual understanding and friendship. A number of factors might have contributed to this development. For both countries, the maintenance of normal relations was a geo-politic imperative. For Ethiopia, the war in Eritrea was showing no signs of ending and its economic strains were becoming a heavy burden. Numeiry had the experience and the means of helping the Ethiopians to resolve the Eritrean problem; his country also stood to gain from a final settlement. Not only would a settlement ease the burden of Sudan's refugee problem, but by solving Ethiopia's own security problem, it would weaken Ethiopian dependence on the Soviet Union, and could thus conceivably help pave the way for the eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa. Numeiry also wanted 'some visible entente with Ethiopia so as to speed his reconciliation with Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had always [advocated] a more neutral foreign policy involving better relations with formerly hostile neighbours like Ethiopia.'<sup>34</sup>

A high-ranking Ethiopian delegation attended the SSU Third National Congress in February 1980, and extended an invitation to the First Vice-President, Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil, to visit Ethiopia. Numeiry announced on 29 January 1980 that Ethiopia

had given Sudan 'the green light to resume its mediation in the Eritrean question.'<sup>35</sup> The First Vice-President took up his invitation in mid-March. The joint communiqué following the visit affirmed both sides' determination to implement existing bilateral agreements and to reactivate the Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee. The Khartoum media described the Vice-President's visit as 'one-hundred percent successful.'<sup>36</sup> In April, there were reports in the foreign Press that Sudan had closed the passage of supplies for Eritrean guerrillas fighting the Ethiopian army.<sup>37</sup> But the reports were exaggerated: few new difficulties were, in fact, put in the way of the Eritrean fighters (see chapter on Ethiopia). Meanwhile, Numeiry renewed his efforts to bring about unity among the three rival Eritrean liberation groups.

Relations with Ethiopia seemed to be further consolidated in May when the Ethiopian Head of State, Col Mengistu Haile Mariam, visited Khartoum for the 11th anniversary celebrations of the May regime. In a joint communiqué the two sides affirmed their commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and emphasized the need to make the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea 'areas of peace free from imperialist interventions.'<sup>38</sup> But the communiqué made no reference to the Eritrean question because Mengistu insisted on treating it as an entirely domestic affair.

Outside sources reported that the Ethiopian side expressed concern over Egypt's professed intention to divert water from the Nile into Sinai and Israel, and said that 'the threat of war between Ethiopia and Egypt over the use of Nile water has receded after the intervention of President Numeiry.'<sup>39</sup>

Numeiry reciprocated Mengistu's visit in November 1980 and received a sumptuous welcome which, according to the Addis Ababa Press, was 'a spontaneous manifestation of historically-rooted bonds of friendship.'<sup>40</sup> In a joint communiqué, the two sides expressed satisfaction over the progress of bilateral agreements in the economic, commercial, cultural, defence and security fields; pledged to stop subversive activities against each other; and agreed to hold regular consultations on issues of direct and common interest. According to foreign reports, Numeiry discussed his proposals for negotiations between Ethiopia and the Eritrean fronts. The proposals called for a ceasefire, followed by an internationally-supervised referendum among the Eritrean population to choose one of three options: full independence, federal links with Ethiopia, or autonomy. In Khartoum, two of the largest Eritrean Fronts, the EPLF and ELF, welcomed the idea of a referendum. The Eritreans' apparent willingness to negotiate with the Ethiopians -- which came as a surprise to most local observers might have resulted from Sudanese pressure. While new life was injected into the negotiations over this thorny problem, there was no visible evidence of success by March 1981.

### *Relations with East Africa:*

Sudanese-Ugandan diplomatic relations, which had been severed following the overthrow of the Amin regime and the controversy over Ugandan refugees, were restored in March 1980. In April, Sudan participated in the Mombasa conference of East African Heads of State, which discussed the revival of the defunct East African Community (see Documents Section for conference report). Numeiry tried to mediate on the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops from Uganda -- a touchy issue for the Kenyans at that time. Besides the security situation in Uganda, which directly affected Sudan because of the number of its refugees in the Southern Region, Khartoum was also interested in the economic and political stability in the Nile valley countries and the opportunity this provided for Southern Sudan to have access to Kenyan ports.

In October, Sudan denied Ugandan allegations that it was keeping forces on its border that threatened the security of Uganda. In December, Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi paid a state visit to Sudan. The two countries declared their support of the Ugandan Government and called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Chad.

### *Relations with the West:*

During 1980 Sudan continued to enjoy friendly relations with the West and seemed to move particularly closer to France in the wake of the Libyan intervention in Chad. Relations with the US, which Numeiry privately visited twice in 1980 for medical check-ups, remained very cordial. In June 1980, Washington announced a grant of \$40m for the purchase of wheat and \$40m for the purchase of other American commodities and machinery.

The Sudanese-American Council, set up in 1978, held a meeting in Khartoum in January 1980 and emphasised the need for greater American investment in Sudan and the strengthening of trade relations. In late July, Sudan denied reports appearing in the Kuwaiti Press that it had agreed to the establishment of an American military base in Suakin. In February 1981, a senior Western diplomat in Khartoum said that the new Reagan Administration would be more explicit in redressing the power balance in the Horn of Africa and that this would entail closer ties with, and more economic and military aid to, Sudan.

### *Relations with the Soviet Union:*

By contrast, Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union remained at a low point. The official monthly, *Sudanow*, blamed this state of affairs on the 'clear and persistent refusal by the USSR to go along with any approaches towards improved relations.'<sup>41</sup> Some Sudanese critics, however, attributed the troubled nature of these relations to a basic lack of balance in Numeiry's foreign policy. According to the former Foreign Minister,

Mansur Khalid, disagreements with the policies of the USSR did not justify undertaking a crusade against the Soviets. There was nothing wrong, he said, in trying to enhance relations with the US, but 'there is no need for us to be any part of a messianic attack against the other super-power.'<sup>42</sup> In the view of Sadiq al-Mahdi, Sudanese concepts of the Soviet Union must first be 'de-mythologized':

The Soviet Union is not the 'heaven on earth' that communists make it out, nor is it the 'devil incarnate' that anti-communists claim it to be. Sudan, therefore, needs to adopt a business-like attitude based on reality and interests. The Soviet Union can help a lot: First, as a super-power counterweight; second, as a place where there has been an experience of consciously-planned economic development. The Soviet Union is also a source of arms ... and we should be looking towards it for diversification, rather than dependence on one source alone.<sup>43</sup>

However, Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union worsened further after the Libyan military intervention in Chad which, predictably, was seen in Khartoum as yet another example of Soviet machinations in the African continent.

#### **ECONOMIC AFFAIRS** (1.20 Sudanese pounds = £1 sterling; £0.50 = \$1)

Sudan continued to suffer from serious economic and financial problems. These problems resulted partly from the Government effort in the early 1970s to accelerate the growth rate of the economy in the midst of very difficult international monetary and trade circumstances and, partly, from cost and price distortions in the agriculture sector. 'The increasingly high cost of oil, the deterioration of Sudan's terms of trade and the high rates of international inflation, which were not fully offset by increased amounts of foreign assistance, had a major negative impact on the performance of the Sudanese economy'.<sup>44</sup>

In addition, the expansion in the various development projects had caused major transport and energy bottlenecks which, in turn, led to a decrease in the rates of productivity of essential commodities for consumption and export. Sudan was exerting efforts to improve the balance of payments situation through rescheduling of external debts and reducing the growing imbalance between imports and exports. According to an IMF survey: 'The fruits of more development effort in terms of increased production may become more apparent during the 1980s upon completion of several projects now in progress.'<sup>45</sup>

#### *The Sugar Industry:*

One of the heavy strains on Sudan's balance of payments was the allocation of over \$1m per day to pay for domestic sugar needs at a time when the country should have

reached a level of self-sufficiency. As *Sudanow* put it, 'Although Sudan's self-sufficiency in sugar production has been predicted for years, current rates of production suggest that the date is becoming very much a movable feast.'<sup>46</sup> The goal of self-sufficiency had been consistently thwarted by increases in local consumption and by low productivity. From 1969-70 to 1979-80, sugar consumption had increased from 210,342 to 330,678t per year while local production during this period was only sufficient to cover 45% of local demand.

Low productivity is attributable to several factors: poor performance of operational schemes, over-costs of new projects, training and management problems, defective equipment and shortages of spare parts, problems in the irrigation system of sugar-cane plantations, and the chronic obstacles generated by the lack of infrastructure and foreign currency.

Despite these difficulties, observers feel that the goal of self-sufficiency may yet be realized. Three new sugar projects at Assalaya, Melut and Kenana were due to begin production by 1980, and it is expected that increased production will help ameliorate Sudan's financial difficulties. The sugar industry, one foreign expert said, because it has its base in agriculture, has a far greater potential for providing Sudan with an economic boost than do mineral resources such as oil.<sup>47</sup>

#### *Oil Developments:*

The prospect of finding commercial quantities of oil, has been heady 'fuel for thought' to a country that not only has to depend entirely upon imported petroleum and petroleum products, but also upon foreign aid-especially from Saudi Arabia- to pay for it. Sudan's total oil bill in 1977 was c. \$279m, representing c. 60% of the year's total foreign earnings. The 1980 oil bill is conservatively estimated to stand at \$385m.

President Numeiry announced in November, that Sudan was producing c. 12,000 barrels per day-about half of the country's imports of crude oil. He also announced the decision to build an inland oil refinery at Kosti on the White Nile. The decision to build the refinery seemed to indicate that oil had been found in sufficiently commercial quantities to meet some of Sudan's domestic needs. According to the estimates of Chevron, the American drilling company, a reservoir of around 50m barrels, producing a sustained flow of between 5,000 and 10,000 bid, would be the minimum to make production commercial."<sup>48</sup>

The discovery of oil is not likely to be an immediate panacea to Sudan's pressing economic problems. Observers feel that it would take about five years before Sudan could enjoy much domestic production. The view in Khartoum, however, has remained optimistic. *Sudanow* commented: "If the present operation can lead Sudan to throw off,

once and for all, the balance of payments deficit on oil-and through this, the balance of payments deficit on food-then a little oil may be enough."

#### *The Gezira Scheme:*

During 1980 the Gezira Scheme, Sudan's most important agricultural producer and exporter, was facing serious problems that threatened to undermine its future role in the country's economy. The origin of these problems can be traced to the Government's decision in 1974 to try to avoid too much reliance on cotton as the major cash crop through the expansion of alternative high-value cash crops such as wheat, rice and groundnuts. At the same time, no change was made in the profit-sharing arrangements which were in effect when cotton was the only cash crop that was cultivated. Since the production relationship in the scheme centred on a three-way partnership between the Government, the management and the tenants – each receiving a fixed share in the net cotton profit -- tenant farmers tended to neglect cotton and concentrate on other cash crops that they could market independently of the Gezira Board and for which they could obtain immediate cash payments."

Consequently, cotton output, which is more profitable to the economy, had shown a declining trend over recent years. The misallocation of resources in the agricultural sector had resulted in a direct adverse impact on Sudan's trade balance, with less revenue in the face of rising costs and expenditures.

The problems of falling yields and rising costs were further compounded by management problems, with the scheme suffering from increased bureaucracy and decreasing autonomy. Tenant farmers also faced serious cash and labour problems, and their standard of living was in need of substantial improvement. The future role of the Gezira Scheme in the economy called for a reassessment of production relationships and a review of long-term planning. In February 1980 the World Bank agreed to a loan of c. \$30m for the reconstruction of the scheme.

#### *1980-81 Budget:*

The Budget was based on a continuation of the 1978 economic stabilization and financial reform which aimed at curbing inflation, regulating and controlling public expenditure, stabilizing prices, reducing customs duties of certain commodities, liberalizing external trade, mobilizing internal savings, and progressively reducing State monopolies. Introducing the Budget to the National Assembly in June 1980, the Finance Minister, Badr al-Din Suliman, reported a trade deficit of \$1.24bn, a balance of payments shortfall of \$500m, an oil bill costing \$1m a day, and an economic situation in which "regretfully our exports show no rise in prices equal, or nearing, that of our imports".<sup>50</sup>

The Budget shows an increase in revenues of only 10% over the 1979-80 Budget - - attributable to the relative stagnation in State revenues mainly as a result of the fall in cotton production and the decrease in the price of groundnuts and edible oils on the world market. The general distribution of the Development Budget was as follows: agricultural sector, £SI06.3m; industry, mining and energy, £S62.3m; transport and communications, £S67.9m; administrative services, £S32.4m; Regional Development, £S46m; and Emergency Reserves, £SI5m. The Development Budget comes under the second phase of the 1977-83, Six-Year Development Plan.

Sudan's critical economic situation means that it will need substantial external aid to proceed with this economic reform programme. A World Bank report noted:

The economic adjustment process will take a number of years to be completed. It will require that the international community would provide increased levels of external assistance on concessionary terms, including substantial balance of payments support. In quantitative terms Sudan would need transfers of external resources at a level of not less than US \$800m per annum over the next few years to be able to cope with its present balance of payments crisis and to maintain its development momentum.<sup>52</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For previous surveys of Sudan, See *Africa Contemporary Record* (ACR) 1968-69, 1969—70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979--80.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-Mostakbal*, Paris, 12 April 1980.

<sup>3</sup> *Sudanow*, March 1980, It was clear at the time that these sentiments reflected the views of former SSU secretary-general, Abu al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim, who was dismissed from his party post and from the Vice-Presidency in August 1979, partly for his unrelenting opposition to the policy of reconciliation. Abu al-Qasim also caused some sensation in December 1979 when he suddenly announced his candidacy for the post of SSU president, which meant in constitutional terms, challenging Numeiry for the Presidency of the Republic. Local observers saw Abu al-Qasim's candidacy as an attempt to air some of the differences with the regime that had led to his dismissal. However, he was eventually persuaded by friends to withdraw his candidacy (for fear that it might be used by opponents of the regime), and thus this extraordinary challenge was not allowed to run its full course.

<sup>4</sup> *Africa Confidential*, London, 26 March, 1980.

<sup>5</sup> *Al-Mutakbal*, 12 April 1980.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>7</sup> *Le Monde*, Paris, 5 March 1980. 'Tentative desesperée de redorer la blason d'un régime isolé et incapable de tenir ses promesses de libéralisation.'

<sup>8</sup> *Al-Dastur*, London, 8-14 December, 1980.

<sup>9</sup> *Unpublished interview*, Khartoum, 26 and 29 November 1980.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Dr Mansur Khalid, *Sudanow*, March 1980.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>12</sup> For more details on the decentralization plans see *ACR* 1979-80 p. B114.

<sup>13</sup> See *ACR* 1979--80.

- <sup>14</sup> *Sudanow*, April 1980.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>16</sup> See ACR 1978-79. p. B115.
- <sup>17</sup> As one Southerner put it: 'Why do we labour in elections when we know that the Assembly is too demoralized or incapacitated to solve one single problem? What is the point of lobbying for the right HEC leadership when we know very well that no President will be able to do anything for the benefit of the people?' *Sudanow*, May 1980.
- <sup>18</sup> 'Southern public opinion proved itself dissatisfied with this curtailment of the democratic process, particularly in that it was extricably, if reasonably, tied to intervention from the national political centre.' *Sudanow*, July 1980.
- <sup>19</sup> See ACR 1974--75, pp 898-9.
- <sup>20</sup> *Sudanow*, August 1980.
- <sup>21</sup> *Sudan Progress*, Nairobi, May 1980.
- <sup>22</sup> *The Observer News Service*, London, 27 June 1980.
- <sup>23</sup> *New African*, London, May 1980.
- <sup>24</sup> According to one survey. '40% of Sudan's doctors, 30% of its engineers, 45% of its surveyors, 25% of university staff members, and a high percentage of carpenters, mechanics, electricians and so on are utilizing their skills to develop other nations.' *Sudanow*, January 1981.
- <sup>25</sup> *Sudanow*, May 1980.
- <sup>26</sup> *Al-Ayam*, 2 April 1980.
- <sup>27</sup> *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 1 April 1980; *Akhbar al-Yom*, Cairo, 4 April 1980.
- <sup>28</sup> See ACR 1976-.7, pp B114--5.
- <sup>29</sup> *Al-Sahafa*, 22 December, 1980.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 30 December 1980.
- <sup>31</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 19 January 1981.
- <sup>32</sup> *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 15 January 1981.
- <sup>33</sup> *Asharq Al-Awsat*, London, 31 January 1981.
- <sup>34</sup> *New African*, London, February 1981.
- <sup>35</sup> *Al-Sahafa*, 30 January 1980.
- <sup>36</sup> *Al-Sahafa*, 16 March 1980.
- <sup>37</sup> *Middle East Economic Digest*, London, 18 April 1980.
- <sup>38</sup> *Al-Ayam*, 29 May 1980.
- <sup>39</sup> *The Observer News Service*, London, 6 August 1980. 'Mengistu and Sadat reached the point of threatening war because Sadat would not tolerate any interference from Ethiopia on the Nile question, and Mengistu objected to Sadat using African waters to help the Israelis. President Numeiry has tried to reduce the tension by undertaking to increase yield of water from the Nile complex so that there will be enough to spare.'
- <sup>40</sup> *The Ethiopian Herald*, Addis Ababa, 19 November 1980.
- <sup>41</sup> *Sudanow*, April 1980.
- <sup>42</sup> *Sudanow*, March 1980.
- <sup>43</sup> Unpublished interview.
- <sup>44</sup> *World Bank Press Release*, Paris, 11 April 1980.
- <sup>45</sup> *IMF Survey*, Washington, 1 September 1980.
- <sup>46</sup> *Sudanow*, October 1980.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>48</sup> *The Financial Times*, London, 14 March 1980.
- <sup>49</sup> *IMF*, *op cit.*
- <sup>50</sup> *Sudanow*, October 1980.
- <sup>51</sup> World Bank, *op cit.*