
ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE THIRD WORLD:

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith

PRAEGER (New York 1985)

Chapter 5

Perception, Preference, and Policy:

An Afro-Arab Perspective of Anti-Americanism

Mohammad Beshir Hamid

The evil in the world almost always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding. On the whole, men are more good than bad; that, however, isn't the real point. But they are more or less ignorant and it is that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of an ignorance which fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the right to kill...

Albert Camus, *Le Peste* (1947)

Anti-Americanism, as such, is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it one originating in, or confined to, Third World countries. Consider the following expressions: "Degraded thinking, lying deception and unlimited greed are the natural and inescapable consequences of the commercial spirit, a spirit that like a tidal wave inundates the highest and lowest elements of American society". "In this [American] society composed of a mixture of all peoples, freedom is purely materialistic and lacking in all idealism". "Just read the newspapers of opposing parties during a presidential campaign, and rest assured, you would believe the candidate for this highest honor in the United States deserved life-imprisonment sooner than residence in the White House". "Cheating is an old American custom".

For going over the preliminary draft of this paper and for their valuable advice and comments, I am grateful to Professor L. Carl Brown, Director of the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.; to Professor Richard P. Stevens of the Center (or Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; to Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein of the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.; and to Professors Richard and Carolyn Lobban of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Rhode Island College, Providence R. I. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for the perspective and the shortcomings.

These statements, independent of any value judgment on them have a familiar ring and could have been uttered by such certifiable anti-Americans in the Third World as Kwame Nkrumah, Mu'mar al-Qaddafi or Fidel Castro. In fact, these sentiments were expressed by German writers in the mid-19th century.¹ That most famous of all German intellectuals defined the ultimate aim of Capital as “laying bare the economic law of motion of modern society,” which entailed a thorough and systematic criticism of capitalism. The “guiding thread” of Marx's teachings was expanded and diffused, through the German Social Democratic Party, to expound the tensions and conflicts generated by capitalist development and to provide radical critiques of capitalism as an economic and social system. Theorists such as Lenin, Kautsky, Luxemburg and Hitferding sought to link the development of imperialism to the continued strength of capitalism. They, thus, laid down, in a variety of ways, the ideological framework of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism as expressions of anti-Americanism. European anti-Americanism was by no means historically and intellectually monopolized by German writers and Marxist intellectuals. Samuel Johnson stated that, “I am willing to love all mankind except an American”²; while Clemenceau noted that “America is the only nation in history which miraculously has gone directly from barbarism to degeneration without the usual interval of civilization”.³

This European anti-Americanism could have influenced the evolution of a similar sentiment in the Third World in two, rather paradoxical, ways: first, through the process of acculturation during the period of Western colonialism; and, second, through the association of the United States with the colonial powers during the decolonization process. On another level, European anti-Americanism, in its past and contemporary forms, as well as its intellectual (Marxist) and political (Gaullist) manifestations, was bound to be reflected in the thinking of those in the Third World who were fascinated by the ideological content of the former, or admired the independent-mindedness of the latter.

Anti-Americanism is thus a relatively older phenomenon than is generally assumed; the origins of its Latin American variety in fact dates back to the Monroe Doctrine and the encroachment of “Yankee imperialism”.⁴ Although anti-Americanism is not necessarily an immediate product of the postcolonial period or a function of cold war rivalries, both the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and the extensive projection of U.S. global strategies to contain it, tended to fuel the intensity of the sentiment and its proliferation on a world scale. The U.S. intrusion into the postcolonial settings in the Third World merely triggered what - for lack of better terms as well as of tangible evidence may be called latent or instinctive anti-Americanism.

Another related point is that even in its contemporary form, nowhere was anti-Americanism so clearly and vehemently manifested than in the United States itself during the youth rebellion of the 1960s. The intensity of this manifestation ranged from the rejectionist counterculture of the U.S. "anti-American" generation", to the apparent absence of any significant social group that seemed to be affirmatively pro-American. One U.S. observer of the social scene noted at the time:

The flower children are indeed the enemies of mass, industrial society; the revolutions that so often fascinate and beguile them have never brought to power a social system that would accept them, even when those revolutions succeeded in bringing a considerable measure of political power and social amelioration to the previously disadvantaged classes.... The major social contribution of beleaguered hippies and student militants may be to provide us with a salutary reminder that a reexamination of the traditional association between freedom and equality which, in the democratic myth reinforce each other, is long overdue.⁵

It must be remembered that it was about this time that many African and Arab countries, recently emerged into statehood, were entangled in, and trying to cope with, the acute problems of nationhood. During these formative years, the turmoil and burning issues (both literally and figuratively) in U.S. society left little to emulate from an "American way of life" so demonstratively rejected by many of its own young people. At the same time, U.S. policy (particularly in Vietnam) seemed blindly determined to fashion the world according to America's own image.

In short, the United States appeared to be a society internally divided by lack of understanding between social groups, while at the same time pursuing foreign policies also characterized by an equally incomprehensible lack of knowledge about the realities of the outside world. It was, indeed, a time when it was very difficult in the Third World (just as it was for many young Americans) not to be anti-American.⁶

THE DYNAMICS OF IDENTIFICATION

Perception and the Ideological Political factor

For the educated Africans and Arabs, political education begins at an early age and is largely shaped by the hard political and socioeconomic facts of life. During the formative years of politicization (mostly in school) they are exposed to different and competitive ideologies that they must relate to their own indigenous experience. As a result of this interaction, ideological identification usually evolves in three main ways: the rejection of Western values and culture and the assertion of pre-colonial roots and values (e.g., Islamism, Arabism, *négritude*); the adaptation of European ideologies to local needs and indigenous circumstances (e.g., Arab socialism, Afri-

African socialism); or the option for what is considered a universally valid and applicable ideology (e.g., Marxism, communism of either the Soviet or the Chinese types). The ideological diversity of Europe and the clear lines of demarcation in the political systems, provide viable ideological options, while the indigenous culture and tradition provide either a basis for implanting the new ideology or an alternative to it. Central to this re-adaptation process is a constant reaffirmation of indigenous roots, of what Cabral called the “return to the source,” which essentially involves “not only a contest against foreign culture but also complete participation in the struggle against foreign political and economic domination”.⁷

In this search for workable ideological and political formulae, the U.S. model receives scant support since it is conceived by most of the educated elite as being devoid of ideological content. Even the liberal democracy favored by some of the nationalist elite, and in many cases inherited from the colonialist era, has more in common with British parliamentary liberalism than the U.S. presidential type which, within the African and Arab context, seems to make for the kind of “imperial presidency” most closely associated with pro-American authoritarian regimes (e.g. Egypt under Sadat, Sudan under Numayri, Zaire under Mobutu, and Kenya under Moi).⁸

Although many of the educated elite, notably among university students, are familiar with the U.S. political system, such familiarity has meant little in terms of ideological identification. Indeed, it has tended to generate a view of the U.S. system in which the lines of ideological demarcation are so blurred, if not nonexistent, as to provide no real political alternatives and therefore, no real claim to democratic practices. Even when social differentiation was sufficiently illuminated, as during the unrest of the 1960s, it showed middle class radicals pitted against an establishment whose main support came from a working-class “silent majority”. It was not a matter of class conflict but rather a manifestation of displaced and repressed interclass hostility.

Americans may have little patience for ideological interpretations and even less for such notions as social differentiation and class conflict. But within the Third World context these are important, particularly among the educated elite, as a function of perception and identification. From a U.S. perspective, for instance, it may be easier to blame anti-Americanism in the Third World on the malevolent influences of communist propaganda. The evidence, however, indicates that Western propaganda is more prevalent than communist, and, paradoxically, more likely to generate anti-Americanism than anything else. More people listen to the BBC and the Voice of America than to Radio Moscow. In the Sudan and Egypt, the immense popularity of U.S. movies is only equaled by the negative images they project of U.S. society.

Thus increased exposure to and knowledge of U.S. culture and policies tend to arouse antipathy not sympathy, while the relative lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union leaves untarnished the appealing ideology with which the educated elite is familiar. The issues again are related to ideo-

-logy and perceptions. When the West talks of “democracy”, it raises in the question in the educated African mind why the West, particularly the United States, is supporting authoritarian and, in the case of South Africa, racist regimes. The concept of freedom conjures up unpleasant reminders, in the view of many Arabs, of Western complicity, past and present, to deprive them of it. To many people in the Third World, the image of the “unfree” world that comes most readily to mind is not that of the Gulag, but of their own continued economic subjection by the West, not to mention that of ethnic and unprivileged minorities in the West itself.

This negative picture is actually reinforced by direct contact with the U.S. experience. The perceptive African and Arab observer of the U.S. scene is often profoundly struck by the discrepancy between democratic ideals and political practice; between the warmth of individual Americans and the insensitivity of society and the body politic as a whole; and between, technological advancement and an educational system that seems geared to the arithmetical functioning of an opportunity-structured society but not to any profound understanding of the algebra of its history and, still less, to that of any other society. The United States is acknowledged as the land of opportunity yet it is also seen as the land of “scarcity in abundance”; and the society that could send men to the moon seems incapable, at the level of social justice, of providing equal rights in practice for its black citizens.

This impression of U. S. society is, obviously, not shared by all. Some manage to develop a taste for U.S. life and values which makes it that much more difficult for them to relate to their own culture and/or to readjust to the harsh realities at home, while others are genuinely impressed by some positive aspects, such as freedom of expression, which they find lacking in their own society. Yet even the sympathetic few cannot articulate their sympathy in terms of identification either as preference or ideology, unless they are also members of the privileged elite. Ironically, those who enjoy the American way of life do not want to see it duplicated at home. The “free enterprise” system in the Sudan and Egypt produced all the evils of capitalism without any redeeming gains except for the ruling and rich classes. To identify ideologically with capitalism is thus incompatible with identification with the masses of the people. For the educated elite it also means incurring the intellectual stigma of being pro-imperialist and, for those in leadership positions, of being U.S. puppets.

By contrast, the very internationalism of Marxist ideology enables communists to uphold their ideological credentials without necessarily being discredited as foreign agents, although pro-Western regimes often use such accusations to persecute them and other noncommunist opponents. These measures are usually counterproductive because they tend to endow communist movements with acceptance and popularity, particularly among circles of the educated elites in

authoritarian regimes. In Africa and the Arab world, the idea of communism is potentially attractive because it has proved itself in the Soviet Union and in China as the foundation of a society knit into a strong fabric. On an intellectual level Marxist ideology has a particular appeal:

The spread of Marxist-inspired regimes in the Third World is no aberration of history. For Marxism, as a theory and a practice, contains elements that have proved of considerable relevance to the Third World in the epochal struggles of the 20th century. Its emphasis on material causation, on class conflict as the motor force of history, and its totalizing theory of society have provided the intellectual underpinnings for a powerful moral philosophy advocating social justice, equality, and freedom from exploitation, both national and social. In the harsh conditions of the impoverished continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, it is not difficult to understand the attractions of such ideas.⁹

If the African and Arab peoples are intrigued with these ideas, they naturally want to know what the local communists have to say. When communists are persecuted by established authority, they seem to thrive under proscription and their popularity proportionally increases.¹⁰

The U.S. depiction of communism as an evil force in postcolonial settings proved to be self-defeating. In Africa, the Americans were seen as somehow adopting the British ideals of the nineteenth century a hundred years too late. When Europe put down the “white man’s burden” the Americans picked it up in the name of anti-communism.¹¹ This anti-communist crusade, which indiscriminately classified those who were not pro-American as essentially communist, seemed to leave Africans with little alternative except, perhaps, communism. It was, in effect, a crusade against the forces of history and the prospects of change. A prominent Kenyan journalist put it this way in the mid-1960s: “The easiest way to push the African towards communism is to tell him he needs to be protected from it Russians are interesting to us simply because [Americans] hate them so much”.¹²

This self-defeating U.S. approach was paradoxical in yet another sense. In ideological terms, the “wind of change” in Africa and the Arab world, if its momentum were allowed to develop naturally, was moving in a direction not necessarily parallel to, or in conformity with, “international communism”. Religious, ethnic and cultural consciousness was more inherently anti-communist than anti-American. The legacy of colonialism and the intrusion of neo-imperialism had, indeed, induced many nationalist leaders, who would not proclaim themselves sympathetic to Marxism, to denounce imperialism in Marxist-Leninist terms because of the relevance of the phraseology to local conditions. “But Marxism is also at odds with the many forms of indigenous oppression and mystification which have arisen in the context of the anti-imperialist upheavals of the past decades, which seek to enlist the support of all opposed to imperialist domination”.¹³

In the Arab world, the two main driving ideological forces in the post-independence period were Ba'thism and Nasirism. Both aimed to provide focal points for Arab nationalism as ideological alternatives to communism and capitalism.

In Ba'thist ideology the emphasis is more on Arabism, *al-'Aruba* (not without a hint of racism) and less on Islam, because giving priority to religion would exclude non-Muslim Arabs and include non-Arab Muslims.¹⁴ The preference for an ethnic identification over a religious one (although the latter was by no means rejected or ignored) did not mean that Ba'thism was any more anti-American than it was anti-communist, except in so far as, like many other nationalist movements, it sought freedom from Western domination. Indeed, the emergence of Ba'thism in the early 1940s predated active U. S. involvement in the Arab world and also reflected the disillusionment of the movement's founders ('Aflaq and Bitar) with communism, to which they were earlier attracted. It is significant that when Ba'thist leaders went to President Nasir in early 1958 to plead for an Egyptian-Syrian union (the ill-fated United Arab Republic) one of their primary concerns was to preempt a possible communist takeover in Syria.¹⁵ IS Khalid Bakdash, the leader of the Syrian Communist Party hurriedly left Syria when the proposed union was consummated. It was only in reaction to the projection of U.S. power and the increasing involvement of U.S. policy in Middle East politics that Ba'thism in both its Syrian (*al-Qiyada al-Qawmiyya*) and Iraqi (*al-Qiyada al-Qutriyya*) forms became a strong source of anti-Americanism and a chief ally of the Soviet Union.

The same was true of Nasirism. As an ideology and a political movement, Nasirism was more pragmatic and less inconsistent and factionalized than Ba'thism. Its socialist orientation was acquired piecemeal through a trial-and-error approach and culminated in the socialist charter of 1962.¹⁶ But its driving force lay more in the charismatic personality of Nasir than in its ideological content. The popularity of Nasirism among the Arab masses was such that the Egyptian Communist Party, which had opposed the revolution from the beginning, finally dissolved itself in the mid-1960s and came under the wing of Nasir's Arab Socialist Union. Nasirism provided the main ideological bulwark against communism, yet at one and the same time it entailed a massive Soviet presence in the Arab world for the first time. The paradox can be explained and the explanation demonstrates, as we shall later see, how the U.S. anti-communist fixation was instrumental in bringing about the very eventuality that it sought so zealously avert.

In Africa, the intellectual and ruling elites who turned to socialism ranged from those who wanted to adapt socialism to the African condition and proclaimed Africa's right to its own indigenous "road to socialism," to those who rejected Western European socialism in favor of "scientific socialism." The latter were more in evidence in those African countries which gained independence not through a nationalist movement led by Westernized elites but through armed

struggle. It was no coincidence that the United States - with its peculiarly blinkered understanding of political realities - had supported the established colonial authority and thus placed itself on the losing side. In all of these countries, anti-Americanism was evident, though in varying degrees of intensity.

It is conceivable that this might not have been the case had the historical process of change and ideological interaction taken its natural course. The result, obviously, could have been more socialist and Marxist ideological identification among African states. But it is unlikely that there would have been a Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Nor does the prospect of the emergence of socialist, or even Marxist, regimes in Africa necessarily mean an extension of Soviet power - unless the United States makes such a "linkage" not only possible but inevitable. The experience of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam vis-à-vis China actually point in a different direction.

Another emergent form of the dynamics of identification outside the established elites is the growing *popular* anti-Americanism of the underprivileged masses under pro-American regimes or those regimes which had switched from a pro-Soviet stance to a pro-American one, mainly, but not exclusively, in the hope of getting more aid from the United States (e.g., Egypt and the Sudan). There is no comparable sentiment flowing in the opposite direction in pro-Soviet regimes although the economic situation in these is often even worse.

Preferences and Models of Development

In Africa and the Arab world the attainment of formal independence brought in its wake new informal forms of external control and influence more corrosive than the old imperialism inasmuch as they encouraged the trend toward oppressive and authoritarian rule. The economic structures of these emerging regimes were perceived as either 'socialist' ("communist" or "leftist" in U.S. eyes), "free-market" ("capitalist" or "conservative" in Soviet eyes), or "mixed-economy" (viewed by both as capitalist disguised beneath a socialist rhetoric). According to Richard Falk, the ideological leanings of these regimes are better understood in terms of the developmental crunch that has generated a wide array of authoritarian solutions. "Socialism and capitalism, although each is manifest in a variety of forms, provide the ideological underpinnings for the principal choice between developmental options".¹⁷

The case for a capitalist model of development in Africa, as presented from a U.S. perspective, is based on three interrelated premises. First, the "African mentality" must rid itself of the "self-deception" implicit in the claim that the West is largely responsible for the underdevelopment of Africa (Kenneth Adelman), and adopt "the old-fashioned American virtues of thrift, honesty, tolerance, civil discipline and hard work" (George Kennan). Second, the West offers the only means to escape the vicious cycle of economic crises (Kennan), and economic development can

be achieved by encouraging internal change and interplay with the outside world (George Ball). Third, not only should Africa adopt traditional Western values, but it should accept the legitimate efforts of the United States to promote its own economic interests on the continent (Adelman).¹⁸

These prescriptions, based on the United States' own experience, are seen by many African intellectuals as having their own limitations within the West itself as well as being politically unacceptable and economically suspect within Third World contexts. It is, obviously, legitimate for the United States to give a proper regard to U.S. interests but these are not necessarily compatible with African interests, nor really conducive to the economic advancement of Africa. If African leaders tend to blame their own troubles on real or perceived Western influences, it is precisely the continuing Western interventionism that provides such complaints with moral force and political justifications.

To many Africans and Arabs, the past is not irrelevant to the present and the future. As Coker rightly noted:

America's own values are as foreign to Africa as they are to the rest of the Third World... The African's suspicions are after all rooted in a colonial past which formed a historical prologue to the present predominance of Western interests...Indeed, the material change to African societies produced by contact with the North explains why their experience of Northern models has served to reinforce the skepticism of an entire generation of African leaders and made hypocrites and self-servers of the rest.¹⁹

The record of those countries that have opted either for a "capitalist" system or for shifting from a "socialist" to a "mixed-economy" model, usually under U.S. denationalization pressures, is evidence of the bankruptcy of the capital-intensive approach to development. The image of such a model drawn from U.S. values was conjured by one leading Sudanese capitalist in the following terms: "This area is changing and we are taking the American route. You'll see, we'll have Wimpy burger stands, Kentucky fried chicken shops, blue jeans and popcorn".²⁰ He, somehow, failed to mention "apple pie".

The economic situation in Kenya is belied by a glaringly widening gap between rich and poor that has produced a security situation bordering on an undeclared state of class war. Even in a country exceptionally endowed with resources, such as Nigeria, the western economic and political institutions have proved to be a recipe for coups, corruption, and conflict. If, in terms of economic growth, South Africa is an exception to the general rule, it is an exception that in human, political, and economic terms, actually proves the rule of the "unacceptable face" of capitalism.

In Egypt, private enterprise has replaced socialism since the mid- 1970s. Egyptian intellectuals

have condemned this transformation as a betrayal of the earlier socialist ideals and a surrender of Egypt's independence. Ghali Shoukri argued that “The laws opening the way to economic dependence on the West approved ‘in the name of free economy’ follows a course parallel to the stages of political dependence on the United States and Israel, justified ‘in the name of peace’”.²¹ Haykal noted that:

The conditions affecting Egypt were to be found to a greater or lesser extent in most Third World countries. These, being on the whole exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods, were usually at the wrong end of any trading bargain ... Indeed, Egypt was not being transformed from a planned economy to a market economy but to a supermarket economy. The disrupting effect which this transformation had on Egyptian society can hardly be exaggerated.

To Haykal, “An Egypt whose economy was controlled from outside, in effect, from Washington, would be isolated from the Arab world, and oil money would be used simply to keep Egypt afloat rather than allowing her to exercise her natural role as leader of the Arab world”.²²

An Egyptian political sociologist in the American University in Cairo described U.S. presence in Egypt as “a shadow government,” complete with departments corresponding to the official governmental and administrative organs. This massive U.S. penetration of Egypt's political, economic, and even cultural institutions, is seen as part of a well-coordinated plan to make Egypt “psychologically,” as well as politically and economically, “subservient” to the United States. The old inferiority complex toward the “foreigner”, *'ugdat al-khwaja* (submerged under the national self-assertion of Nasir's rule), was being subtly revived and cultivated.²³

Western writers, such as David Hirst and Irene Beeson have also indicted Sādāt's regime for his “Americanization” of Egypt through the policy of *infitāh* (“open-door” economic policy).²⁴ It is clear from the chain of events from the “food riots” of January 1977 to Sādāt's assassination in October 1981, that the military, political and economic association with the United States has unleashed an anti-American sentiment within Egyptian society which far surpassed that of the “official” anti-Americanism of the Nasirist period, if it had not indeed confirmed and evoked it.

A related factor in the resurgence of this popular anti-Americanism is the resentment of economic packages imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The economics of Egypt, Zaire and the Sudan seemed to have been placed under the management of these international institutions and other Western financial circles. The enforced adoption of the austerity measures prescribed by these institutions almost amounted in practice to a performance of political *hara-kiri*. In the Sudan, just as in Egypt, the imposition of IMF measures led to spontaneous antigovernment and anti-American popular uprisings which on several occasions came close to toppling the pro-American Numayri regime.

Obviously, neither the IMF nor the World Bank are, technically or formally, organs of the U.S. government. But in the popular mind they are perceived as such - a perception which, given the degree of U.S. – leverage in these institutions, is not that much of a misconception.

In both the Sudanese and Egyptian cases, the governments blamed communist agitation and Soviet machinations for the “disturbances”. Such explanations readily fell on receptive ears in Washington and all they helped to produce was more doses of the same medicine. In the meantime, local communists must have been bemused by - without failing to take due political note of - the fact that they were being credited, not discredited, with having more political muscle than their own estimate of their political strength would allow for. The communists may not have invented the IMF and the World Bank, but they certainly stand to thrive and to make political capital out of the existence and activities of these institutions.

The very orientation of the international economic institutions tends to defeat their declared objectives. The right-wing ideology and private investment priorities of the World Bank and IMF seek to promote reliance on the free play of market forces and to ensure the avoidance of debt defaults, nationalizations and restrictions on imports and on outflow of profit. The recipient governments are expected to adjust to their resulting problems through devaluations, removal of subsidies, cuts in government expenditure and wages, balancing the budget, and restricting credit. While these policies may make economic sense in the developed capitalist system, their impact on developing economies can be devastating, not the least because of their insensitivity to political and social considerations. It is mostly the poor classes who are hit economically while the projected growth remains elusive.

The 1973 oil crisis triggered a trend toward a new international economic approach based on the premise that the world economic order had outgrown the classical concept of independence and the assumptions of limited national interests. In essence the new interdependence seeks to redefine “North-South” relations in such a way as to accommodate the interests of both by contributing to the development of the poor “South” without affecting the growth and prosperity of the developed “North”. As expressed in the Brandt report, this approach argues that “the self-interest of nations can now only be effectively pursued through taking account of mutual interests”.²⁵

However, the concept of interdependency, noble as it may seem, is still fallacious.²⁶ It assumes a measure of equality and partnership that in fact does not exist, and given the nature of the world order, it is extremely naive to assume that it ever will. The concept is also not unbiased since the economic model presented seems to favor a capitalist orientation and to safeguard existing Western interests. Implicit in the approach is an economic “domino theory” that is related to Western global strategy.

Thus, countries like Somalia and the Sudan which are seen as having no major economic importance to the West are to be kept economically afloat because they are of vital strategic importance within the context of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Northwest Africa. As Edward Heath (a member of the Brandt Commission) put it, "...like so many other least developed countries in Africa and Asia, their stability is threatened by radical forces whose success is nurtured by economic deprivation and inequality. If these radical forces are given the opportunity to make progress, others like them around the world will also be encouraged. Moderate leaders will conclude that they cannot rely on the West to support them".²⁷

This is in line with U.S. aid policy and its proclaimed aim of preventing Third World countries from passing into the communist bloc. More suspect and alarming to many people in the Third World is the connection of U.S. aid policy and the activities of multinational corporations.²⁸ Hayter argues that it is doubtful, to say the least, whether the recent growth in manufactured exports as a result of foreign investment can be said to be of benefit to the peoples of underdeveloped countries:

They are, much as before, doing the dirty work of the West, and they are being unmercifully exploited. The increase in export-processing activities in underdeveloped countries is a special phenomenon; it is not a balanced process of industrial growth... In addition, in most underdeveloped countries, the supposed blind forces of the market are, in reality, much helped by the repressive apparatus of the state, which in turn is aided by the West.

In this sense, the motif of Third World countries is less that of *interdependence* as *independence* from dependence on foreign trade, technology, finance or values.³⁰ Capitalism in both its internal and related external forms, is unattractive and unacceptable in economic, political and human-rights terms. Within a Third World context, it is a "recipe for doom".

By contrast, therefore, socialism is seen as the more attractive model for development. African socialism is based on the debatable proposition that the "primitive communalism" of the African "tribal" society facilitates the setting up of modern socialist structures. The interpretation of this indigenous socialism varies from Nyerere's *Ujamaa* program, to Sekou Touré's earlier emphasis on agrarian cooperatives and trade unionism, to Senghor's intellectual concept of *négritude*. Arab socialism of the Nasirist type gave priority to an extended public sector and to central control of planning.

While the preference for socialism is a reality, its record in practice, as Falk pointed out, is too poor at present to support the preference. "Socialism *as applied* to date in the Third World deprives it of the moral advantage associated with socialism *as theory* or as an ideological perspective".³¹ Yet despite the unsatisfactory record of socialism in practice, the pertinent question of preference in this context is one in relation to capitalism.

The Egyptian masses might not have fared well under the socialism of Nasir but they have fared even worse under the *infitāh* policy of Sādāt without, one may add, enjoying some of the positive attributes (the sense of independence and dignity) imparted by the former. The ordinary Tanzanian may not be economically better off than his Kenyan, Zairean and Sudanese counterparts but the economy under which he labors is still indigenous or at least not a captive of a manipulative international economy.

The main challenge to socialism comes not from capitalism but from Marxism. African Marxists have dismissed the notion of building socialist models on the communal traditions of tribal society on the grounds that communalism had, in fact, been eroded under the impact of historical processes culminating in colonialism and modernization and had given rise to antagonistic social differentiations. Even where the vestige of “tribal communalism” is still manifest, it has already assumed the form of embryonic class conflict; its natural evolution would, therefore, be toward a capitalist mode of production, not a socialist one.

According to Samir Amin, the real world of expansion of capital has produced a form of “transition” which was not forecast: “a series of 'national liberation' revolutions...where elements of bourgeois revolution are inextricably linked with elements of socialist revolution”. Amin argues that the outcome of this “transition” could take different forms. “This outcome may be socialist (in the sense of the abolition of classes) or statist (in the sense of the “revisionist” model magnified by contemporary Soviet reality), or even be only a transition towards a higher stage of capitalist development”.³²

To Amin, the ideological evolution of Arab socialism reflects its contradictions and poverty. He argues that a radical critique of Nasirism is essential and must be undertaken in association with that of “revisionism” by which he means not only a critique of Soviet state policy but also, and above all, a critique of the theoretical basis, the class analysis, and the strategy of what he calls “*pseudo-marxisme*”.³³

Most African and Arab Marxist intellectuals, as distinct from communist movements and parties, tended to prefer the Chinese model of development. Thus, Fanon's concept of national violence (which is not the same as terrorism) and his emphasis on rural authenticity as the repository of national values,³⁴ have much in common with Chinese Marxism, although Fanon himself had not adopted scientific socialism as such. The preference is shared by some African-socialist regimes as is evident in the *Ujamaa* approach of Tanzania.

In the political setting of Africa and the Arab world dominated by competing ideologies, revolt and revolution, the reaction of the United States has been to equate revolution with subversion, and to confuse “the concrete processes and consequences of unrest, subversion or dissidence, which vary country by country, with the generalized threat to the U.S national security. This failure to distinguish between the particular and the global is a major cause of interventionism”.³⁵

THE FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION

Continuity in Discontinuity and the “Self-fulfilling Prophecy”

One of the striking features of U.S. policy is a remarkable consistency which, despite the drastic changes and the radical transformations sweeping throughout Africa and the Arab world, remained as rigid as it was self-defeating. The succession of different administrations (from Truman to Reagan) has not interrupted the consistency of approach. Although there have been shifts in emphasis there has been no change in direction. This phenomenon, incidentally, has called into question some of the basic assumptions of democracy in the two-party system.

From the strategy of “containment” of the late 1940s to the policy of “strategic consensus” of the early 1980s the main policy objectives have remained the same, namely: to prevent Soviet “expansionism” and to preserve the *status quo* either through suppression or support of “friendly” suppressive regimes or, at best, through inducements of social “reform”. Both objectives had little relevance to the political and socioeconomic realities of Africa and the Arab world, and U.S. persistence in pursuing them rebounded badly on the United States. Not only did the U.S. nightmare (Soviet expansionism) turn into a reality in the Third World but it did so because of, and not despite, U.S. policy, and in the process, it was the United States which was projected as the real enemy and the main obstacle to social and economic transformation.

In the first place, most countries in Africa and the Arab world did not regard Soviet “expansionism” as a direct threat. U.S. efforts to press them into believing in the Soviet threat produced the opposite effect, even in those countries that desired to remain or become pro-American. Second, the political forces at work in the postcolonial period tended toward radical socioeconomic transformation - a transformation that was incompatible with either the existing order or with gradual reformism (e.g. of the kind administered by the Shah in Iran). Thus, U.S. policy was perceived, on the one hand, as emailing unnecessary and potentially dangerous entanglements in cold-war politics and, on the other, as trying to arrest the inevitable and irresistible processes of historical change.

In the Arab world, the decolonization process was a period of turmoil in which competing nationalisms and new ideologies were asserting themselves as the old order was disintegrating.

In inheriting the interests of colonialism, the United States also became the recipient of the animosities generated by the forces of nationalism. The United States had become a world power but Americans had little experience in this role and still less of the local and regional realities with which they had to deal.

The irony is that most Arab nationalist leaders, to whom the Soviet Union was a remote and largely unknown entity, were well disposed toward the United States despite the negative and disappointing U.S. role in the decolonization struggle. It was, in fact, to the United States that Nasir at first turned for military and economic assistance. The Americans, however, wanted Egypt, in return, to join the proposed Western regional defense system against the Soviet Union. To Nasir, the real danger to Egyptian (and Arab) interests came not from the possibility of a Soviet attack but from the actual presence of British troops stationed in the Suez Canal and the threat posed by Israel. More to the point, Nasir realized that a communist threat was more likely to come from within and that the position of local communists would be greatly strengthened by Egyptian participation in Western defense pacts. He told the Americans so.³⁶

The Americans, apparently, were not impressed with these arguments. Egypt's encounter with the United States thus turned into a confrontation with all the disruptive marks of an escalating cycle of action, reaction and counteraction. Nāsir felt threatened by the Baghdad Pact, the Israeli raid on the Gaza strip, and the machinations of the CIA.³⁷ In the face of U.S. reluctance to provide him with arms, Nāsir turned to the Soviet Union and thus effectively broke the Western monopoly of arms supplies and influence in the region. When the Americans, partly in retaliation, withdrew the offer to finance the building of the Aswan dam, Nasir reacted by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The counteraction of the West was the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956.

Nāsir emerged from the Suez crisis with great political prestige not only in Egypt but in the Arab world where, paradoxically, the Americans then enjoyed for a time a certain measure of goodwill for their successful pressure on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. But this goodwill was rapidly eroded by the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon in 1958 (the forerunner of the United States' current predicament), the continuing support of Israel, and generally, the persistent obsession to view developments in the area through cold-war binoculars.

From an Egyptian viewpoint, U.S. attitudes toward the Egyptian revolution varied from efforts to “tame” (*tarwid*) and “contain” it (*ihitiwa*), to attempts to “punish” (*igab*) and use “force” (*unf*) to destroy it.³⁸ Instead of coming to terms with the new nationalist forces in the Arab world, as opposed to traditional conservative elements, the United States regarded these forces as a threat to Western interests and/or an instrument of Soviet policy in the region. When the United States,

in the mid-1960s, became the main direct supplier of arms to Israel and the conservative regimes in the Middle East, and tried to exert pressures on the radical Arab states, the anti-Americanism sentiment and rhetoric of the latter intensified while their reliance on the counterweight of the Soviet Union correspondingly increased.

The radical Arab movement saw itself on an inevitable collision course with the United States “so long as the goals and means of American policy in the Middle East remained incompatible with Arab interests and as long as the United States continued to play its world role in a manner inconsistent with the interests of peace and progress”.³⁹ The crunch came in June 1967. Yet even when, in the wake of defeat, the Arab nationalists were preoccupied with undoing some of its shattering consequences, U.S. policy showed neither the flexibility that could have served its own interests, nor the impartiality that might have redeemed it in the Arab world. The June war of 1967 led to the October war of 1973 with all the inevitability of some supernatural force.

Fouad Ajami viewed these developments in terms of both their political implications and cultural impact. He argued that the Arab world was witnessing the simultaneous advance of the “civilization” that technology promised and the determined resistance to it:

The bitterness of the 1967 defeat pushed the Arab world still further from the United States - further even than the Arab elite may have wanted. This would be borne out by the turn of events after October 1973. The success of October enabled the Arab elite to indulge their tastes in alliances, in technology, in models of development - and the American advantage was there for all to see. Americanization and anti-Americanism are two sides of the same coin. The political anti-Americanism displayed in the Arab states and in Iran as the 1970s came to an end was in great measure an expression of the region's rage at itself; it was a display of agony over cultural surrender. The American push into the region has succeeded all too well.⁴⁰

The U.S. “success”, such as it was, succeeded in swelling the wave of Islamic and nationalist reassertion that, as an expression of the “popular culture” of the masses, threatened to sweep away the “Westernized culture” of the ruling elite.

It is sometimes argued that the Kissinger diplomacy of the post-1971 period broke with the traditional rigidity of previous U.S. policy. The United States, by establishing a monopoly of influence in Egypt, succeeded in the exclusion of the Soviet Union - a feat later crowned with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Yet the evidence seems to indicate that Kissinger's diplomacy, and subsequent U.S. policy, is merely the continuation of the old strategy with the emphasis shifted to different local actors. As

to American gains, they have been more illusory than real. True, Egypt has, for the present been “tamed” as was the Iraq of the 1950s; but it is doubtful whether the implication of this situation is necessarily conducive to the United States' best interests, not to mention those of its Egyptian client. The Arab world has been “Balkanized” as never before and the PLO, though sharply split, has become even more radicalized (Yāsir 'Arafāt is now considered a “moderate”). The Palestinian problem remains as elusive as ever, while the Reagan “peace plan” has floundered in Lebanon where a quarter of a century ago the Eisenhower Doctrine met the same fate.

The implications of the new-old realities seem lost on U. S. policymakers. The U.S. response is the “rapid deployment force” operating within a new “strategic consensus” (to many Arabs, the old Baghdad Pact in new guise) which even the United States' traditional “friends” in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are wary of and which, ironically, reflects U.S. concern for the stability of their regimes. The main destabilizing agent is still identified in Washington as the Soviet Union despite the fact that the history of the Middle East since the 1950s indicates that the major source of tension and anti-Americanism is continuing U.S. interventionism.

Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of Egypt. To many Egyptian intellectuals, the alliance with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel, far from leading to stability, have injected a new instability in the region by enabling Israel to redirect its military expansionism to the Lebanon and other Arab countries.⁴¹ The failure of the United States to modify its total commitment to an expansionist Israel is seen as amounting to the creation of “the era of Imperial Israel”. As Haykal noted, “This is a prospect which can only be regarded with the greatest foreboding, particularly for the West which probably stands to lose by it more than even the Arabs”.⁴²

The almost universal Arab resentment of Sādāt's policy centered mainly on his “Americanization” of Egypt. But Egyptians, in particular, also resented his decision to provide military facilities to the Americans (as during the ill-fated attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Tehran) and to give asylum to the Shah of Iran. The latter move was seen as no more in Egypt's interest than it was for the Americans who hypocritically applauded the gesture that relieved them of responsibility toward their former client.⁴³

It is often assumed in the West that Sādāt's friendship with U.S. leaders enabled him to present the Arab case and, for the first time, to give Western opinion a proper understanding of the Arab world and its problems. Haykal, rightly, argued that this was not the case:

What the West was watching was the performance of a superstar; the public in the West appreciated the posture of one man, not the problems of millions. Nor was there any realization of the price at which superstardom had been bought...It is not the mark of a good general to capture a new position at the cost of losing his own base.⁴⁴

By starting down the road to Jerusalem that would eventually lead him to Camp David and the peace treaty with Israel, Sādāt achieved a new apotheosis in the Western world, but not in his Egyptian constituency and certainly not in his Arab environment. Paradoxically, Sādāt's main bargaining power was his increasing readiness to make even more concessions. The irony of his position was that the more he tried to make Egypt the principal bastion of U.S. and Western interests in the Middle East, the more he alienated the other Arab states and, conversely, the less valuable his role was bound to be to the United States.⁴⁵ Like his U.S. patrons, Sādāt was caught up in a web of dazzling but ultimately self-defeating illusions. The cost of U.S. "friendship" was, in fact, to unleash in Egypt violent and unpredictable counter-forces, the vehemence of which was manifested in that swift and inevitable moment of retribution so terribly visited on President Sādāt on October 6, 1981.

It is perhaps a measure of the intensity of anti-Americanism in Egyptian society that one of the most widely held conspiracy theories following Sādāt's assassination assumed the complicity of the CIA in his demise. The premise of this assumption was that "Sadat had served his purpose, particularly by his recognition of Israel; [he] was now a liability rather than an asset, and so had become expendable, like Diem and other earlier American protégés. It was time for him to be replaced by someone liberal and so more acceptable".⁴⁶

The significance of this view is not its plausibility or the lack of it, but the fact that it gained currency among Egyptians and many other Arabs. This reflected the deep-seated suspicion of the United States, which was not without foundation in contemporary history. It also caught the mood of an anti-Americanism that has now become instinctive. A Saudi diplomat was probably not referring to U.S. complicity but nevertheless arrived at the same conclusion when he remarked after Sādāt's assassination: "First the Shah, now Sadat. It is fatal to be America's friend".⁴⁷

Even within the context of regional geopolitics the balance of power situation is not to the United States' advantage. Paradoxically, the Soviets' painful experience in Egypt might have taught them the important lesson of the dangers of high visibility and of putting too many constraints on their Arab allies. It is Syrian, not Soviet policy which is now relentlessly and successfully being pursued, although from a Soviet perspective, the interests of the two are not incompatible.

For the United States, history keeps repeating itself but the lessons are largely left unheeded while the cost of reflexive interventionism continues to mount. Compared to what the Americans had experienced in Iran, what they are experiencing in Lebanon, and what they may experience in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, the anti-American reactions and manifestations of the 1950s and 1960s might, in retrospect, seem a model of moderation and restraint.

In Africa, just as in the Arab world, the *fact* of revolution and the *fear* of revolution have also

dominated U.S. policy. John Girling noted that:

Both fact and fear converge in the belief that 'indigenous' insurgencies and urban mass struggles as well as explicitly communist-led revolutions can be manipulated – at first by 'international communism', then by Moscow or Peking - in a chain reaction of revolt against 'transitional' structures of authority in one Third World country after another. This is seen as a 'universal' threat, encompassing America's own security; thus it requires an equivalent response.⁴⁸

The U.S. policy objective in Africa is two-fold: first, to install pro-American regimes (the Congo-Zaire) and to protect insecure clients (even when the insecurity is a result of internal opposition, as in the Sudan) or allies in a hostile and insecure environment (South Africa); second, to destabilize or overthrow communist or suspected communist regimes. U.S. military intervention by proxy in the Congo crisis succeeded in installing a pro-American regime in the mid-1960s but this "success", coming against a background of increasing involvement in Vietnam, actually damaged U.S. prestige among some newly independent African states, and aroused suspicions and overt anti-Americanism in others.

The main operative factor in the 'linkage' mentality of U.S. policy manifested itself in the U.S. approach to African liberation movements. In Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the liberation movements combined both the forces of nationalism and social revolution. The French, the Portuguese and the South Africans labeled the liberation movements as "communist-inspired" or led by "communist agitators". These labels fitted nicely into the U.S. concept of a global strategy that absurdly generalized local or regional developments into a universal threat to U.S. security. As a result, the United States placed itself solidly on the colonial side of the struggle. This left the liberation movements with little option but to turn to the Soviet bloc for support, and, in the process, what started as genuine nationalist movements increasingly identified with communism or at least with a pro-Soviet and anti-American stance.

The process had a dynamic of its own. As the liberation struggle intensified, the liberation movements became more radicalized and consequently their anti-American sentiment and posture became more pronounced. When the sudden collapse of the colonial power in Angola left the United States with no established authority to support, the Americans intervened on the side of Holden Roberto's FNLA and, by so doing, probably facilitated the eventual victory of Agostinho Neto's Marxist MPLA and, not coincidentally, the Cuban presence in Angola.

But the destabilization process continued with the South African intervention, in collusion with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, in southern Angola. U.S. policy remained in line with that of South Africa, both in Angola and neighboring Namibia, where SWAPO is engaged in a struggle for liberation from South African control. In 1983 the United States mounted a diplomatic campaign

to obtain a UN-sponsored peace in Namibia in parallel with a withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola. The New York Times noted that, “the linkage with a Cuban withdrawal has been a major demand by both South Africa and the United States”.⁴⁹

The “linkage” that most Africans are more likely to make is between U.S. and South African policies. Given the nature of the South African regime, which is anathema even to the United States’ African “friends”, the implications of such a linkage for the United States in Africa are not difficult to see. The general political mood in most African states is more accurately reflected in this “communist” view:

One can safely say that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola does not suit anyone, including Cuba and Angola. It is equally certain that South Africa and the United States in particular want Cuban troops to leave Angolan territory... [But] the fact remains that both these countries refuse to offer Angola guarantees that her independence and territorial integrity will be respected. This means that the problem is not so much the presence of Cuban troops as the incumbent government and socio-political system in Angola... At the same time the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is a pretext for continuing the illegal occupation of Namibia. Just as an independent and socialist Angola is not to the liking of (South Africa) so her Western allies resent the idea of an independent Namibia with a government formed by SWAPO, the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people.⁵⁰

If the terminology in reference to SWAPO sounds familiar, it is because there are similarities between the situations in southern Africa and the Middle East, and in the U.S. policy attitudes toward both SWAPO and the PLO.⁵¹

An essential component of the U.S. anti-communist strategy is the militarization of its allies and clients in Africa. This has tended not only to have a destabilizing effect on regional politics but also to internationalize them. Sudanese-Egyptian claims of Libyan subversion in Chad, the Sudan and elsewhere were readily perceived in Washington as synonymous with Soviet threats. The Reagan administration was sensitive enough to President Numeiry's allegations of “imminent” Soviet-backed Libyan and Ethiopian “invasions”, to speed up arms deliveries to the Sudan. The inevitable cycle of escalation in Chad and the Horn of Africa tended to transform these local and regional conflicts into yet other pawns in the East-West confrontation.

Testimony delivered to the Committee on Africa of the United States House of Representatives in October 1981 noted that:

What is at stake here is not just the future of Chad as a political entity, but the stability of the entire northeastern region of the continent, and parts of the Middle East. While there is a rough symmetry in the mutual defense agreements concluded between Egypt and the Sudan on the one hand, and Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen on the other, the additional symmetry

of their East-West connections carries serious implications from the standpoint of regional geopolitics. Given the extent of misperception on the part of both Soviet and U.S. policymakers, and the extent to which these are deliberately encouraged by their respective clients, is there any reason to assume that a localized fight between factions may not eventually result in a wider, and far more serious confrontation across national boundaries?⁵²

In the Sudan's case, it was apparent that the regime was tempted to invoke and overlay the communist (Libyan-Ethiopian-Soviet) bogey as leverage for getting more aid from the United States. As this writer noted elsewhere, "The Sudan's excessive reliance on the Egyptian-American alliance might provoke and not deter the hostility of its pro-Soviet neighbours. More seriously, it could encourage and not defuse subversion from within by anti-Egyptian and anti-American groups".⁵³

Image Formation and U.S. Policy

Anti-Americanism is not only a function of how and why people in the Third World perceive the ideology, policies, and actions of the United States. It is also a reflection of how Americans view other societies and the impact of, and reaction to, this vision in the outside world. In a sense, the United States has been reliving, since the Second World War, a new form of isolationism - the isolationism of its own "bigness" which, paradoxically, drives it to seek to reshape the world in its own ways without sufficient knowledge of the cosmos or any profound understanding of the complex issues involved.

This failure, or indifference, to understand the political, cultural and socioeconomic realities of other societies may explain why the actuality of U.S. relations with most countries in the Third World, foe and friend alike, has been manifestly a thorny set of problems. U.S. public views, to the extent that they are coherently articulated, on highly sensitive issues in Africa (e.g. white minority rule) and in the Arab world (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict), are often based on inaccurate information, inadequate analysis, unabashed bias, and dubious morality.

In the United States, as elsewhere, socio-cultural and economic influences play a determining role in fashioning the value system of individuals and groups, and the personal disposition and orientation of policymakers. The sociologist view that socio-cultural factors have a pervading impact on man's perception of political reality, applies equally to Americans:

[These] factors ... help to shape the cognitive orientation of the community and the individuals within that community, that is, their feeling of attachment, involvement or rejection of political objects and beliefs; and their evaluative orientation, that is, their judgments and opinions about other opinions and beliefs which usually involve applying value standards to political objects and events. In other words the decision-makers in any community always act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to

reality itself. Reality is seldom as objective as it seems, or rather as it is made to seem. Reality and its image are not always congruous. Worse still, images are often a distortion of, a deviation from, or simply a misconstruction of reality.⁵⁴

Distorted images can give different shades to reality to the point of being “an impediment to communication”.

To most Americans, Africa is still, literally, a “dark continent”. Educated Africans find this peculiar lack of knowledge incomprehensible in the, supposedly, most highly educated nation in the world, possessing the most effective media apparatus anywhere. The image of Africa in the U.S. media is that of a continent of “abject poverty, rampant corruption, tribal enmity, uncontrolled population growth”.⁵⁵ What Africans find offensive is not the generalized image as such, but the fact that the Western role in creating and perpetuating African problems is rarely acknowledged and is sometimes indignantly denied. The spread of authoritarian regimes in Africa has tended to create an implicit - and sometimes explicit - assumption in the West that Africans are “congenitally” incapable of maintaining moderate, “democratic”, civilian rule. What is not as readily assumed is the complicity of the West and the United States in installing or supporting most of these repressive regimes. The economic and military achievements of white South Africa are often cited as the major exception to the continent's litany of failure, but what is left unexplained is the human cost of *apartheid* and the West's willing collaboration in making these “achievements” possible in the first place.⁵⁶

U.S. administrations seem to regard Africa as “a vast area of conflict with the Soviet Union, in which victory is likely to go to the side that arms its friends and co-opts them in the East-West struggle”.⁵⁷ The attitude of some U.S. public figures and scholars toward Africa has been demeaningly patronizing, if not outrightly hostile. Daniel Moynihan's reaction to Afro-Asian criticisms of the U.S. in the U.N. was to advocate for the Third World an economic version of his celebrated notion of “benign neglect” - a notion which, incidentally, many African intellectuals would have welcomed if only in view of continued U.S. interventionism. Kenneth Adelman argued that Africa's “sorry record” on political and civil freedom made the idea of introducing majority rule in southern Africa “excessively naïve” and might “lead to even harsher restrictions on civil liberty”. Adelman even objected to the adoption of indigenous solutions to African problems claiming that “it is one thing to claim (with a good measure of truth) that Africa will not soon adopt Western values but quite another to say that Africa should not adopt them and further that the United States should not even promote its goals”.⁵⁸

Africa's perennial problems are real enough. But U.S. perceptions of the African experience reflect, at best, a kind of “cultural chauvinism” that assumes the universal validity and applications of U.S. values. As Coker has noted, “in the end, the Africans will have to trust their

own traditions and fight shy of the nostrums peddled by American academics and politicians who have spent the better part of a generation denying them self-respect in the name of their own understanding of progress and freedom”.⁵⁹

If the image of the African in U.S. eyes is blurred, through ignorance or indifference, to the point of obscurity, that of the Arab has been distorted and collectivized to the point of absurdity. From an Arab perspective, what adds insult to injury is that the dehumanization of the Arabs and Muslims in general is, more often than not, intentionally propagated by the U.S. mass media, U.S. public figures, and U.S. scholars.

Since the oil crisis of 1973, the old stereotype of the Arab as a camel-riding and sensuous nomad *à la Valentino* has been updated and transformed into a caricature of the lascivious *sheik* with unlimited supplies of petrodollars. The image of the “incompetent” Arab of 1967 in U.S. popular culture (as well as in the policy-planner's world) assumed, after 1973 a menacing dimension as one who, without any moral justification, was holding the “free word to ransom”. (Many Arabs have not failed to note that when the United States uses its national resources as a leverage in its foreign policy, such as tying foreign aid to pro-U.S. voting records in the UN, this is considered a legitimate exercise in the fine arts of diplomacy).

To deal with “Arab blackmail”, contingency plans and military exercises were undertaken in preparation for the invasion and occupation of Arab oil-fields to remove the “Arab stranglehold” on the West. In the U.S. public mind and mass media, little attention was given to the fact that the principal beneficiaries of the 1973-74 oil embargo and the subsequent rises in oil prices were not the Arabs but the Western oil companies and a small ruling Arab elite.

According to Edward Said, three things have contributed to making even the simplest perceptions of the Arabs and Muslims into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter:

One, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.⁶⁰

The simplistic, crude and often cruel images of Arabs and Islam are disseminated in U.S. society through the mass media, school textbooks, and the writings of U.S. scholars, particularly and somewhat surprisingly, the so-called “area specialists”. The mass media influenced public per-

ceptions through the superficial presentation of the Middle East situation and through the often imbalanced coverage of events in the area, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There were, obviously, exceptions to the general rule, and in recent years attempts were made to adopt a more evenhanded approach. Some U.S. journalists criticized what they considered U.S. Middle East policy that did not serve U.S. interests. But even these exceptional few incurred the wrath of Zionist pressure groups, often in terms of the blanket charge of ant-Semitism. From an Arab perspective, the biased anti-Arab tilt of the media as a whole only confirms the unrelenting U.S. hostility toward the Arabs, their history and their culture. From an objective U.S. perspective, this could only be detrimental to U.S. interests in the Arab world and could have more serious implications for the U.S. position in one of the most critical foreign-policy areas. According to Harold R. Piety, "the average American has a grossly distorted, simplistic view of the Middle East, and this inclines him toward support for a dangerous and destructive national policy in that part of the world. The American press bears a major responsibility for this state of affairs".⁶¹

Indeed, the U.S. mass media increasingly intruded into foreign policy matters that were normally the preserve of political decision-makers and career diplomats. A case in point is the celebrated "media diplomacy" of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and, from an Arab viewpoint, all the disastrous consequences of that controversial move.⁶²

The anti-Arab tradition and practice of the U.S. media have, predictably, fueled the anti-American attitude in the Arab media. This anti-Americanism is a natural reaction to U.S. policy in the Middle East which relates to the Arabs in a very vital and immediate way. The Arab media, in all its diverse political shades and ideological motivations, and regardless of whether or not it is government-controlled, is primarily and consistently preoccupied with the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the predominantly negative U.S. image reflected in the Arab media emanates largely from U.S. behavior and is symptomatic of the U.S.-Arab relationship. "Statements lacking an evenhanded position and made by American governmental leaders, whether of the executive or legislative branch, feed this image, as do the similarly partial commentaries and editorials that appear in the various U.S. media".⁶³

Besides the mass media, Americans are exposed to other cultures and people through textbooks. The findings of some studies and surveys, conducted before and after 1975, on the presentation of the Arabs and Islam in the social sciences textbooks used in the United States, revealed the presence of inaccurate, misleading and incomplete statements (that lead to wrong impressions) and omissions of important facts about the Arabs and their history. Textbooks overemphasized the negative nature of Arab nationalism (to which U.S. difficulties in the Middle East were attributed), and the presentation of the Arab-Israeli conflict showed a bias toward the Israeli

point of view. Islam was misrepresented as a “war-like” religion in which women occupied a position of servitude. Most textbooks used the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. In short, Arab culture and history were frequently measured by Western standards and were characterized by negative stereotyping.⁶⁴

The dismal implications of this situation go beyond the adverse effects of the limited components of civic literacy in the U.S. school system and the related distorted image formation at a young and impressionable age. What is more at stake is the crucial role of the level of knowledge in the process of political comprehension and behavior, and the impact of the lack of cross-cultural understanding on the quality of relations between nations. Luther Evans noted that the presentation as “facts” of unqualified, unbalanced and inaccurate statements can be “the seed to a crop of misunderstanding, hate and contempt among natives and towards other ways of life”.⁶⁵

Even U.S. academic writings on the Arab world are, in large measure, an example of how a learned perspective can support the caricatures propagated in the popular culture. Edward Said examined some of the writings by U.S. scholars and area specialists, and noted that the main things reproduced were “a certain cultural hostility and a sense based not so much on philology as on 'expertise'.” He pointed out the singular avoidance of Arab literature in contemporary U. S. studies on the Near East and argued that, “the net effect of this remarkable omission in modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to 'attitudes', 'trends,' statistics: in short dehumanized”.⁶⁶ It is worthwhile to remember that some U.S. scholars and experts often act as political advisers and economic consultants, and sometimes even policymakers in government and business.

Thus, at almost all levels, the stereotype image of the Arab in the United States is largely one of a negative value. The “Arab” is fixed in a web of prejudices and misconceptions born out of ignorance. In the words of Hazlitt, “prejudice is the child of ignorance”.⁶⁷ Prejudices, willfully preferred or not, have, in turn, the potential capacity of breeding counter-prejudices. In this sense, Arab anti-Americanism can also be seen as a reactive mechanism to the prejudicial attitudes and policies that seem to doom the Arab to a U.S. ordained destiny from which there is, apparently, no easy escape.

CONCLUSION

There is a correlation between perception and preference that tended to reinforce anti-American sentiment in a variety of related forms. The rejection of capitalism and the adoption of socialism or Marxism in African and Arab states was usually based on perceptions of the unacceptability of the former and the appeal of the latter. It also evoked ideological justifications for the preference. These ideological assertions, which became more vocal in cases where socialist per-

-formance had failed to measure up to socialist ideals, often emphasized the limitations of the alternative capitalist model (e.g. the dangers of incorporation into the international capitalist system dominated by the United States).

When the preference for socialism aroused U.S. hostility and interventionism, either directly or by proxy or through destabilization, the anti-American sentiment and rhetoric of socialist leaders and groups was correspondingly intensified. Where U.S. interventionism or pressures succeeded in precipitating a change from a socialist-oriented development model to a free-market economy, the focal point of anti-Americanism tended to shift from the ruling elite to those political and social groups who had little to gain and much to lose (economically as well as culturally and politically) from a capitalist-intensive system and the Americanization process that it almost inevitably entailed.

After gaining independence, Arabs and Africans sought to be left alone; but the intrusion of Great Power politics meant, in effect, that they would not be allowed to shape their own destiny. The Arab world, in particular, was caught in what Ajami called "the eye of the storm":

One power (the United States) is drawn there by economic needs and by all those psychological motivations that drive powerful entities to try to create a world in their image. For the other power (the USSR), there is the desire to break out of what it sees as a hemmed-in position at a time when it may have come to feel that the world owes it more respect than it has hitherto been accorded. The ambitions, fears, and pressures outsiders bring to bear on a tense region are immense and likely to continue".⁶⁸

From the beginning, U.S. policy in the Arab world and Africa, was clouded and constrained by the "undifferentiated globalism" of its approach. Central to this approach was the U.S. anti-communist fixation and its corollary that radical revolutions - invariably depicted as Marxist or pro-communist - had to be condemned, contained and defeated. According to George Ball, U.S. policy makers were "preoccupied to the point of obsession with the question 'how' but there was little patience with the question 'why'." As the United States blundered into a series of military and political *culs de sac*, it encountered only disappointment and frustration.⁶⁹ Not surprisingly, anti-Americanism became a major aspect of radical nationalism in Arab and African countries.

Indeed, the record of U.S. policy in the Third World had been one of missed opportunity and self-inflicted humiliation. Instead of coming to terms with the Mosaddiqs, the Nasirs and the Castros of the 1950s, the United States sought to destroy them and, inevitably, found itself in confrontation with the Ayatollahs, the Qaddafis and the Fidelismos of the present.

By contrast, the Soviet Union, whose world role was, paradoxically, even more complicated by the sometimes mutually contradictory claims of state interest and communist ideology, had a more dear and realistic vision of the world situation. The leadership in the Kremlin might have

have spent some sleepless nights when local communists were ruthlessly persecuted by pro-Soviet regimes as was the case of Egyptian communists in the late 1950s, and Sudanese communists in the early 1970s. But, more often than not, ideological niceties were not allowed to obscure the policy objectives of Soviet interests or to cast policy approaches in rigid dogma. Thus, while the United States continued to view the outside world in “white” and “black”, the Soviets were prepared to regard it in different shades of “grey”. In Africa and the Arab world, the United States seemed insistent in pursuing a policy of “those who are not with us are against us” (dating back to Dulles' “immoralism” of nonalignment). The Soviets, on the other hand, tended subtly to cultivate the approach of “those who are not against us are with us” (dating back to Khrushchev's acceptance of nonalignment and of the “national roads” to socialism).

This situation was obviously to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Soviets certainly did some bungling of their own (as in Egypt and the Sudan in the early 1970s) and had to face some difficult choices (as between Iraq and Iran and between Ethiopia and Somalia, in the late 1970s). But for the most part, all they had to do was to watch U.S. blunders and pick up the pieces. The Soviet presence in Africa and the Arab world came not through “invasion” but by “invitation”.⁷⁰

In the final analysis, anti-Americanism, like many other “antis”, is both an attribute of, and a reaction to, power and the threats and fears, real or imagined, implicit in power. In the case of the United States, the exercise of power can be seen not only in terms of its “arrogance” but also of its “ignorance”. The Shah of Iran remarked in 1976 that his real opposition was himself,⁷¹ - a self-revealing appraisal whose self-destructive implications he himself might not have realized or fully comprehended. The same is true, in a sense, of the United States. While not necessarily being “a nation of sheep”, Americans can certainly be, to use yet another American-coined phrase, their “own worst enemy”.

NOTES

¹ Cited in G.T. Hollayday, *Anti-Americanism in the German Novel, 1841-1862* (Berne, Switzerland, 1977) p. 11. Hallayday's explanation of this anti-American phenomenon is partly that, "European conservatives had attacked America even before the nineteenth century because it was acclaimed by liberals as a model for the Old World. One of the reasons for the intensity of antagonism toward America in the two decades prior to the Civil War was the fact that the conservatives were now joined by disillusioned liberals". p.159. In the context of the contemporary Third World these premises reversed: it is the liberal-leftist groups who are anti-American while the conservatives are pro-American, albeit with some suspicions of U. S. liberalism.

² Quoted in Thomas B. Morgan, *The Anti-Americans* (Michael Joseph Ltd.: London, 1967), p. 8.

³ J.M. and M.J. Cohen, *The Penguin Dictionary of Modern Quotations* (Penguin, Harmondworth, 1971). The remark is also attributed to Bernard Shaw in other sources.

⁴ Anti-Americanism differed from the anti-British counterpart, for example, in that the latter sentiment, generated by the physical presence and control of colonies tended to recede with the end of colonialism as it did in fact, in the case of the United States itself *vis-à-vis* the British.

⁵ Edgar Z. Friedenberg (ed.), *The Anti-American Generation* (Transaction, USA, 1971) p. 15.

⁶ It is important to note that this anti-Americanism was essentially directed against the U.S. system and society and not against the American people as such. Indeed, most of the educated elite in Third World countries tended to sympathize with the young U.S. militants whose anti-Establishment views reflected, in some cases, their own sentiment toward their own military and/or authoritarian regimes. I did not seem much of a coincidence that the most repressive of these were invariably supported by the U.S. government. On both counts, anti-Americanism was reinforced.

⁷ *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches by Amilcar Cabral*. Edited by Africa Information Service (Monthly Review Press; New York and London, 1973). p.11

⁸ This, obviously, need not imply that anti-American regimes in Africa and the Arab world are necessarily less authoritarian but only that the structure of their political organization and their ideological orientation derive from different sources and motivations that are considered or proclaimed to be "authentic" (e.g. Tanzania under Nyerere).

⁹ Maxine Molyneux and Fred Halliday, "Marxism, the Thud World and the Middle East", MERIP Reports, No. 120 (New York, January 1981, p. 18

¹⁰ "Marxism's introduction into the Third World has come through a variety of channels... [But] much blood was spilt to keep communists from power...The repressions in Iran, Iraq, and the Sudan comprise the most notable Middle Eastern chapters in this murderous history". *Ibid.* p. 20

¹¹ See Morgan, *op. cit.*

¹² Hilary Ng'weno, cited in *Ibid.* p. 181.

¹³ Molyneux and Halliday, *op. cit.* p. 20. According to the writers, “Marxism in the Third World has therefore found itself with conflict on two fronts: an overt struggle against capitalist and imperialist domination and a hidden snuggle against those who seek to appropriate revolutionary phraseology for their own purposes. These cramped political and intellectual circumstances have limited Marxist achievements today despite its impressive geographical spread”.

¹⁴ See Patrick Scale, *The Struggle for Syria: a Study of post-War Arab Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1965). Seale offers an interesting explanation of the origins of Arab nationalism that later influenced the ideological orientation of the radical nationalist movements. In the Arab East under Ottoman control, Arabism became an important source and function of identification against a Muslim colonizer, while in Egypt, Islam provided the means of identification against Christian-Western domination.

¹⁵ For a comprehensive analysis of Arab politics in the 1958-70 period, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Aba al-Nasir and His Rivals* (Oxford University Press, 1971).

¹⁶ As an ideology. Nasirism was an amalgamation of socialist principles, Arabism, and Islamism within a framework of Marxist terminology. The Islamic aspects of Nasir's “Arab socialism” was partly a genuine debate into the social content of Islam (istrakiyyat al-Islam) and partly a pragmatic element to give legitimacy and acceptance to the notion of socialism in an essentially conservative Muslim society. Haykal argues that in Nasir's day, Islam was never seen as an obstacle to socialism; on the contrary, strong sympathy was felt with the saying attributed to the Prophet: “There are three things which belong to society as a whole and which cannot be claimed by an individual – fire, grass and water”, a principle which according to Haykal “by many centuries anticipated the doctrine of the nationalization of the means of production”. Mohamed Haykal, *Autumn of Fury: the Assassination of Sadat* (Random House, New York, 1983), p. 129.

¹⁷ Richard Falk, “Comparative Protection of Human Rights in Capitalist and Socialist Third World Countries”, *Universal Human Rights*, Vol I, No 2. April-June 1979.

¹⁸ Christopher Coker, “Neo-conservatism and Africa: Some Common American Fallacies,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No.2 (London) April. 1983.

¹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰ Ray Vicker, “Tycoon Khalil Osman Builds .iii Conglomerate with Oil Money Help”, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 5. 1975.

²¹ Ghali Shoukri, *Egypt: Portrait of a President*, (Zed, London, 1981).

²² Heikal, *op. cit* pp. 90-91

²³ Saad al-Din Ibrahim “Hakumat Zil Amrikiyya fi al-Qahira” (An American Shadow Government in Cairo) *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, No 717 (Cairo Egypt, October, 1982).

²⁴ David Hirst and Irene Beeson, *Sadat* (Faber & Faber, London, 1981).

²⁵ *North-South: A Programme of Survival: Report of the International Commission on International Development Issues* (Pan, London. 1980) p. 269

²⁶ See Fehmi Saddy, “The Fallacy of Interdependence: The New Face of Dependence”. Draft paper for the XVIII Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, St Louis, Missouri. USA. February 16-20. 1977.

²⁷ Quoted in Teresa Hayter, *The Creation of World Poverty* (Pluto Press, London, 1981) p. 11.

²⁸ A Jack Anderson report in *The Washington Post* revealed that the Reagan administration had embarked on yet another secret mission by sending to the Sudan a counterinsurgency team to develop plans for protecting Chevron's oil facilities in southern Sudan against an “insurgent threat”. The report, based on a “highly sensitive State Department cable,” observes that “while Congress and the public are being kept in the dark, Chevron isn’t” *The Washington Post*, October 19. 1983. Since then the anti-Americanism of the rebel movement, because of increasing U.S. military support to the Sudan government, has extended to Chevron. Following attacks on its installations and personnel, Chevron was forced to suspend all its operations in February 1984.

²⁹ Hayter, *op. cit.* p. 109.

³⁰ See Timothy M. Shaw, "Debates About Africa's Future: The Brandt, World · Bank and Lagos Plan Blueprints." *Third World Quarterly*, *op. cit*

³¹ Falk, *op. cit.* Emphasis in the original.

³² Samir Amin, “Expansion or Crisis of Capitalism”, *Third World Quarterly*, *op. cit.*

³³ Samir Amin, *La nation arabe: nationalisme et lutte de classes* (Editions de minuit, Paris, 1976) p. 148.

³⁴ See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1967).

³⁵ John LS. Girling, *America and the Third World: Revolution and Intervention* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1980) p. 218.

³⁶ According to Haykal, Nasir also told the Americans that “if I went and told my people that the British status here is going to be changed from occupiers to partners by a change of flag, they would laugh at me... If I stop leading my people as a nationalist then the communists are going to lead them”. *The Cairo Documents* (Doubleday & Co. New York. 1973). pp. -10-41.

³⁷ It is difficult to exaggerate the degree to which Arabs and Africans suspect and fear the pervasive activities of the CIA. These suspicions and fears, given the U.S. global record, are not of course simply a case of mass paranoia.

³⁸ Muhammad H. Haykal, *Nahnu wa-Amrika* (We and America) (Cairo, 1968) pp. 5-6

³⁹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo, March 17, 1967)

⁴⁰ Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1969* (Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 170.

⁴¹ Shoukri, *op. cit.*

⁴² *Autumn of Fury, op.cit.* p. 276

⁴³ Haykal remarks, with a note of bitterness, that Sadat's offer of asylum to the Shah was "applauded in the West as an act of generosity, particularly by those countries like America and Britain which had all along been the Shah's staunchest supporters but which had no intention of letting humanity get in the way of the interests of state". *Ibid*

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 170.

⁴⁵ Book review by this writer of Hirst and Beeson, *op. cit.* in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 5 No.2 (London) April, 1983.

⁴⁶ Heikal, *op.cit.* p. 268

⁴⁷ *Time*, (Atlantic Edition. Amsterdam). October 19. 1981.

⁴⁸ Girling, *op. cit.* p. 15.

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, March 12. 1984.

⁵⁰ Milailo V. Stevovic, "Angola: Eight Years of Independence", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXXV (Belgrade, February 5, 1984).

⁵¹ For an analysis of the settler-colonial nature of Israel and its South African connection, see Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial Settler State?* (New York, 1973); and Richard P. Stevens and Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, *Israel and South Africa: The Progression of a Relationship* (New World Press, New York, 1976).

⁵² Cited in Mohammad B. Hamid, "The 'Finlanclizanon' of Sudan's Foreign Policy: Sudanese- Egyptian Relations since the Camp David Accords", *Journal of Arab Affairs* Vol. 2. No.1 (Fresno, California, Spring 1983)

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Mansour Khalid, *The Socio-Cultural Determinant of Arab Diplomacy*. Selections from Sudanese literature (2), (Washington, D.C.) n.d. p.2

⁵⁵ *Time*, (New York) January, 16 1984.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Coker, *op. cit* p. 283

⁵⁸ Cited in *ibid* p. 291. Adelman even manages to invoke a kind of frivolous cultural determinism to support his case. "Traditional African religions," he explains, "are entirely devoid of notions such as 'fate' or 'the forces of history' marching towards progress and redemption (Christianity) or prosperity and liberation (Marxism). In the traditional African religious scheme an injury, death or calamity can be explained only in direct personal terms as stemming from individuals or ancestral ill-will. This mind could lead some Africans to track the evils of Ian Smith or *apartheid* not to chance or historical forces but to direct personal ill-will stemming from the West".

⁵⁹ *Ibid* p. 299

⁶⁰ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1977). pp. 26-27. Said maintains that "no person academically involved with the Near East - no Orientalist that is - has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself whole-heartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identification on some level, but they have never taken an 'acceptable' form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests (oil company and State Department Arabists, for example, or with religion". p. 27.

⁶¹ Harold R. Piety, "Bias on American Editorial pages" in Edmund Ghareeb (ed.) *Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media* (American-Arab Affairs Council, Washington, D.C. 1983), p.142.

⁶² See Montague Kern, *Television and Middle East Diplomacy: President Carter's Fall 1977 Peace Initiative*, CCAS Occasional Paper series, Georgetown University (Washington, D.C. 1981).

⁶³ Adnan Ahu Odeh, "The American Image in the Arab Mass Media" in Ghareeb, *op. cit.* Some of the principal features of the factual elements that have created and continue to maintain the anti-American image in the Arab media are: U.S. policy toward the Palestinian question is partial and biased; the U.S. is endangering its own interests in the whole region in favor of one small and aggressive state, Israel; the U.S. is imperialistic in its approach to the Middle East, seeking hegemony and exploiting the region's resources; and the U.S. does not keep faith with its Arab friends. pp. 358-59.

⁶⁴ For surveys on the shockingly limited knowledge of international issues among U.S. students, and the inaccurate information disseminated in U.S. schools, see Samir Ahmad Jarrar, "The Treatment of Arabs

in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks: Research Findings and Recommendation” in *Ibid.*, pp. 381-90; Ayad AI-Oazzaz, “Sorat al-Watan al-Arabi Fi al-Madaris al-Thawiya al-Amrikiya” (The Image of the Arab Homeland in American Secondary Schools) in *AI-Siysa al-Amrikiya wa al-Arab* (American Policy and the Arabs) by a group of Arab scholars (Beirut, 1982), pp. 233-49; and Frank D. Klasen and Howard B. Leavitt, *Teacher Education and Global Perspective*, ERIC Clearing-house on Teacher Education, American Association for Teacher Education (Washington, D.C. 1982). The last survey found “weaknesses in such fundamental areas as geography... pervasive ignorance of the Middle East and Africa... lack of knowledge about Western Europe and misunderstanding of some key aspects of American history and government”. p. 13

⁶⁵ Cited in Ayad AI.Qazzaz, *op. cit.* p. 370

⁶⁶ Said, *op.cit* p. 291

⁶⁷ Quoted in M. Khalid, *op. cit* p. 11

⁶⁸ Ajami, *op. cit* p. 21

⁶⁹ George W Ball, Edward J. Derwinski and Philip J. Geyedin, “United States Policy in the Middle East”, CCAS Reports (Georgetown University, April, 1984) p. 1

⁷⁰ It hardly needs saying that for the Soviets also “presence” in a Third World environment can be a hazardous undertaking, as in Afghanistan, and may lead to humiliating “expulsions” as was the case in Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia.

⁷¹ *Le Monde*, (Paris, October 1, 1976)